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AIMS AND POLICY

I. *Aim:* The aim of this quarterly shall be to provide a forum (1) for the discussion of Christian faith and life on the basis of the Lutheran confession, (2) for the application of the principles of the Lutheran Church to the changing problems of religion and society, (3) for the fostering of world Lutheranism, and (4) for the promotion of understanding between Lutherans and other Christians.

II. *Policy:* The editors will welcome contributions that are likely to be helpful in the furtherance of the aims set forth above. It will be required of such contributions that they be frank and fair in their discussion of moot questions; that they be free from controversial animus; and that their contents be of real scholarly and practical value to the readers. Difference of opinion between contributors, or between a contributor and the editors, does not of itself exclude articles from publication since the editors do not hold themselves responsible for the opinions of contributors.

THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY

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Philosophy, the Social Sciences, and Theology

By Benjamin Lotz

HOW can philosophy, in its contemporary forms, or the social sciences—particularly psychology, sociology, anthropology, or historiography in their ever widening scope and increasing depth—contribute to American Lutheran theology? This question is much easier to raise than to answer, and a definitive answer can scarcely be expected here. Nevertheless, it is a very interesting question and deserves consideration, even if it appears to be only cursory consideration. This attempt to raise the question, however, may cause other American Lutherans to seek further light and suggest other areas where significant investigation can be made.

In the learned world of today the definition of philosophy is not so secure as to be easily obtainable. There is wide divergence among thinkers as to its scope and its method. In many circles philosophy is a matter of methodology, and its supreme achievement has been in the division of statements into meaningful and meaningless, analytical and synthetic, or into scientific and emotive ones.[1] In this way it conditions the basic fields of investigation, not only in the social sciences but in the natural sciences as well. There are likely some who would apply this rigorous method to the study of theology.

Any easy attempt to define and limit the social sciences might end in controversy which would have no particular meaning for this study. Since the days of August Comte philosophy has witnessed the breaking away of various phases of its field of investigation, and now these divisions are likewise undergoing further subdivisions. It would likely come as a surprise to the average college student of today to know that physics, chemistry, biology, and the like were once viewed as natural philosophy in distinction from logic and moral philosophy, though the latter was probably studied with psychology and similar disciplines. Mention might be made of the fate of psychology, where many subdivisions have been introduced and where, without seeking an exhaus-

1 Morton White, *Religion, Politics, and the Higher Learning* (Cambridge, 1959), pp. 22 ff.

tive classification, clinical, experimental, social, abnormal, and adolescent psychology have emerged.

When the theologian comes to grips with the social sciences and penetrates deeply into their fields, he becomes aware of what they can offer him. If philosophy can show the dogmatician the limits of human reason, the social sciences can offer great insights to the Christian moralist. The anthropologist is the mentor for the student of Christian missions. The psychologist with his constant research into man's responses and reactions has a vital word for the theologian. The sociologist who studies the ever changing nature of man in society, and the social structure as well, is an invaluable aid. The devout educator who has studied the learning process can furnish needed techniques in offering the Gospel to overcome man's disintegration, his frustrations, and the guilt and anxiety which arise from knowledge of sin. Philosophy and the social sciences can hold up to the theologian the need for a genuine objectivity in his research and can warn him that neither his vocation nor his subject matter will offer him any kind of special pleading.

I

Further light might be thrown on this question if a specific topic is considered at some length. It is a well known fact that Lutheran theologians used to view the Christian faith in its systematic form on the basis of certain theological topics which were called *loci.* While no one today would construct a system of theology on this basis, these *loci* do furnish convenient topics for the analysis of certain phases of the Christian faith. In fact, any one of them might be isolated for this purpose, and in this way the contribution of philosophy and the social sciences could be considered. If, in turn, other *loci* are viewed, it would be possible on the basis of these various studies to create a synthesis that would have much to offer the theologians of our church.

One might begin with the *locus de homine,* the discussion concerning man. In all the old Lutheran works on dogmatics, there is a residue of the Platonic notion that man is composed of body and mind, or of body, mind, and spirit. One may suspect, although it cannot be easily substantiated, that the Cartesian-Lockean tradition which has come to us in American Lutheranism with our common language has not been

without great influence. But when a reader becomes aware that an attack is impending on the false dichotomy or trichotomy which common sense has been taught to accept, he will be reminded of Paul's statement in I Thess. 5:23 concerning the soul, mind, and body. Yet forty years ago, when newer conceptions of the human personality were hardly known to the theologian, the implications that might have been found in this apparently sharp trichotomy were glossed over by commentators.[2]

The passage of years has not removed this tendency to look upon man as a machine, a ghost, and an ethereal substance. It continues to be taught if not defended in books of instruction for American Lutheran youth and seems to be the way of thinking among many ministers and laymen.[3] This is not in harmony with the Scriptures, as becomes evident in newer translations, and certainly it is not the view held in recent studies in philosophy and the social sciences. For while it is often convenient for the sake of analysis to speak of emotive, volitional, or cognitive behavior, the sharp separation of the human organism into soul, mind, and body has generally been abandoned. Rather, man is viewed as a living organism that reacts with every varying response, in numerous degrees of significance, to all the stimuli of his environment.

This can be made explicit in any number of ways, though numerous illustrations are not needed. In our colleges, where modern textbooks must be used, psychology is concerned with the observed events of behavior, and this method is basic for all the social sciences. In fact, it will be asserted that the phenomena of human personality described as thinking, learning, language, perception, and emotion are to be studied simply as forms of behavior and are to be described in objective if not in measurable terms. It will further be asserted that there is no reason to believe that mental events differ in any fundamental way from any other kind of behavior or that they require any specific principles

2 Cf. George G. Findlay, *The Epistles to the Thessalonians,* "Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges" (Cambridge, 1914), p. 123: "It is not necessary to regard *spirit* and *soul* and *body* as three distinct, logical divisions of man's nature. . . . He begins with the innermost—'your spirit,' nearest to God, . . . and he ends with 'body,' the vessel (ch. IV:4) and envelope of our nature, through which it belongs to the external world and holds intercourse with it. The soul, poised between them, is the individual self, the living personality in which spirit and flesh, common to each man with his fellows, meet and are actualized in him."

3 Cf. T. A. Kantonen, *The Christian Hope* (Philadelphia, 1954). The position expressed here is in keeping with modern Lutheran thinking, and while the author leans somewhat to the traditional view which has come from the Greeks, mediated through the Cartesian-Lockean tradition, he has much to say to American Lutherans.

for their description. The so-called mental activities, like other types of human behavior, are functions of the organism. Or in the words of the logician of the logical positivistic school, there is no denotation for the concept mind.[4]

For the purpose of analysis, it must be repeated, a student may make a distinction at times between states that seem to be definitely mental and those which are best designated as physical. The growing emphasis in medicine on psychosomatic disorders indicates that in a sense they are irreducibly distinct. It is doubtful that the mental state is learned (though at times not without error) through introspection while the physical state is often best known through an examination of behavior. For if another person would know that I am thinking of the square root of 2, he must learn this not through possible evidence of behavior but only because I have reported it to him.[5]

If one would probe further into how modern books deal with man as an organism, one would likely run across terms of emergence and the theory of levels. For many people man's mental activity is also to be viewed in terms of organization or activity. The condition of man's body, or what would have been called the *material self,* might be described as the lowest level. Man's *mind* would then be described as a higher or a more complicated level of reality, yet just as much the function of the life processes as purely bodily functions.

This rather superficial and inexact explanation shows how modern man seeks to avoid the pitfalls in the old, vexatious question of the relation of body, mind, and soul, but it also indicates his desire to view man not as a mental substance in a subcutaneous, physical substance but as a living organism whose behavior can be observed acting in a purposeful manner.[6] This does not mean that an old, crass materialism is used to describe the crown of God's creation, for the arduous work done in the field of axiology in recent years indicates a growing awareness of what previously would have been described as the spiritual life. Rather, this mass of literature in philosophy and the social sciences which has become accessible to students of the present generation ought to make the theologian aware that he has a task to perform.

4 Smith and Smith, *The Behavior of Man* (Henry Holt and Company, 1958), p. 22: "Psychology became established as a science only when it abandoned the mind as an entity and turned its attention to the observable events of behavior."

5 Arthur Pape, *Elements of Analytical Philosophy* (New York, 1949).

6 Harold H. Titus, *Living Issues in Philosophy,* 2nd edition (New York, 1953).

II

If a student schooled in this newer understanding of man reads one of the books of the last century, either in German or English, he will mark the difference at once. Luthardt repeated the view that was traditional in earlier Lutheran theology, seemingly unaware that it was more Platonic than scriptural: "At the end of the creation of the world God made man, a free person consisting of body and soul."[7] This dichotomy, or a possible trichotomy, is repeated in any sample of American Lutheran dogmatics one is likely to pick up. It is true that Valentine recognized the fact of a scientific anthropology, though later he insisted that man is a compound being, composed in part of material from the physical earth and in part of an immaterial element given by divine spiration or a direct action of the creative power. More than any other Lutheran dogmatician in America he seemed to be aware of the changing feeling in regard to man, for he insisted that the expression "breathing into him the breath of life" is not to be taken literally but as a symbolic expression for a direct and positive gift of spirit life.[8]

John A. W. Haas, who is reputed to have been aware of the changing climate, contributed an essay in a *Festschrift* in honor of his one-time mentor Henry Eyster Jacobs. His essay was entitled "The Soul in Society," and though he softens the sharp dichotomy, he never really comes to grips with the question at issue.[9] More recently there appeared a symposium with the title *What Lutherans Are Thinking,* and although there is no defense of the old dichotomy or trichotomy, the question concerning man's nature is carefully avoided.[10] Only in some little books written for teen-age Christians is there anything like a modern approach to man, designated as a rebel and yet one to whom God can speak not merely in judgment but in grace through Jesus Christ.[11]

III

The task that faces Lutheran theologians in America, whether professional theologians or parish ministers, becomes clearer when an

7 Chr. Ernest Luthardt, *Kompendium der Dogmatik* (Leipzig, 1886), p. 146.
8 Milton Valentine, *Christian Theology* (Philadelphia, 1906), I, p. 380.
9 J. A. W. Haas, in *Theological Studies* (Philadelphia, 1924).
10 E. C. Fendt, ed., *What Lutherans are Thinking* (Columbus, 1947).
11 Cf. Martin J. Heinecken, *Basic Christian Teachings* (Philadelphia, 1949).

examination is made both of the newer versions of the Bible and of the works of modern commentators. These accord to a greater degree with the present view of man, and this is achieved because they are truer to the real biblical conception than ever was the King James version of the Bible. They indicate a greater awareness of the original texts. In Gen. 2:7 the word *nephesh,* rendered "soul" in the King James version, is translated as "being" in the Revised Standard version, and this denotes *a complete person.*

It would be extremely laborious to indicate the many changes in exegetical outlook that have come with modern times, though a few examples will be helpful. In I Kings 17 there is the account of how Elijah restored to life the child of a widow. Both the King James version and the Revised Standard version are identical in their translations: "And the soul of the child came unto him again and he revived." The exegete in the *Interpreter's Bible* takes issue with the translator by saying that the translation is misleading. He believes that the translator supports the illusion that the word "soul" is used in the Bible for some part of man's nature which is immortal and therefore survives death. This is not the interpretation of modern exegesis.[12]

Neither the Hebrew word *nephesh* nor the *psyche* of the New Testament refers to an immortal soul of man, even though both words have been regularly translated "soul." For though "soul" is found 460 times in the Old Testament and 57 times in the New Testament, modern exegesis declares that the best rendition of *nephesh* is "life," in the sense of that ordinary, physical life which ends with death. In the Septuagint the Greek word *psyche* is used in precisely the sense of the Hebrew *nephesh,* and in this sense the word is carried over into the New Testament. A comparison of Mark 10:45 in both the KJV and the RSV will bear out this meaning of *psyche.*

IV

While the newer exegesis as well as newer works on theology are more in line not only with the biblical doctrine of man but also with contemporary philosophy and the social sciences, it might be well to see whether this is reflected in the liturgical material that is published from time to time by American Lutherans. Inherited liturgical texts rest

12 *Interpreters Bible,* Vol. III, p. 148.

upon Latin and Greek originals while much of their English dress stems from the Church of England. There the Graeco-Roman tradition in regard to man, particularly as mediated through the Cartesian-Lockean philosophy, has been very strong. And the sharp distinction that Descartes made between *res cogitans* and *res extensa* is quite apparent in our liturgical forms.

A few examples will make this clear. The collect for the nineteenth Sunday after Trinity, with a sharp distinction between body and soul, has long been in all our service books, and no change was made in it. On the other hand, a collect for St. Luke's day, which is new in our collection, repeats the idea as reference is made to the healing of men's souls and bodies. In the Burial Service a collect, likely from the prayer book of the established church in Scotland, shows how the Platonic influence has entered from Britain into American Lutheranism. The feeling expressed in the words "delivered from the burden of the flesh" implies that the flesh offers more burden to the Christian life than can be justified from a careful reading of Romans 7. Many hymns which assert that death means a separation of body and soul, although not without some scriptural justification, are generally not in harmony with the dominant New Testament teaching, with which modern studies in eschatology are in accord, or with the forthright confession of millions of Christians each Lord's Day when they say, *I believe . . . the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting.*[13]

Obviously the work of the liturgiologist has lagged behind the better understanding of the Scriptures which has been achieved through newer linguistic analysis, historical research, and a more adequate understanding of the ancient world. The contributions of philosophy and the social sciences which have appeared in countless studies concerning the behavior of man and his complex and ever changing environment, not to mention the somewhat timid and tentative attempts to restate the Christian faith in the light of his new knowledge, have been passed over when liturgical forms and service books are produced. Doubtless this defect is due not merely to the conservative character of Lutheranism but also to the rather prevalent antiquarian interest on the part of many Lutherans interested in things liturgical.

13 A careful survey would reveal that the Lutheran *Service Book and Hymnal* has few hymns on the resurrection and judgment in comparison with hymns on heaven as the home of the soul. See, e.g., hymn 590.

V

It ought not to be overlooked that this attempt to profit from the contributions of philosophy with its more rigorous methodolgy and from the various social sciences with their many insights will not be achieved without tension, criticism, and misunderstanding. About forty years ago, Edwin H. Delk, a Philadelphia clergyman, presented a series of lectures which contained a plea for the restatement of Lutheran theology. The reading of his brave lecture will be a stimulation for a young man with theological interests, though many of his points have become rather dated. His plea was not only for insight into biblical problems and for an understanding of comparative religion but for a statement of the person of Christ in modern terms.

A few years ago C. B. Gohdes and his colleague W. O. Doescher, of Capital University, tried to indicate that a true understanding of the Lord's Supper is not adequately described in terms of *substance,* derived from seventeenth century philosophical concepts, but in a recognition of the presence of our living Lord. His contemporaries misunderstood his position, which was in part vulnerable but on the whole was a brave attempt to move into a more adequate conception of this phase of Christian doctrine.[14]

Since that time there seem to have been all too few indications that deliberate attempts are being made to understand and restate American Lutheran theology in modern terms where the contributions of philosophy and the social sciences are taken into account. It is hard to believe that this will not soon come to pass, and for that this sketchy article is a plea.

14 Edwin Heyl Delk, *The Need of a Restatement of Lutheran Theology* (Philadelphia, 1917). *The Lutheran Church Quarterly*, Vol. 17 (1944), p. 340 ff.; Vol. 18 (1945), p. 314 f.

The Minister's Therapeutic Role in the Field of Mental Health

By H. Paul Santmire

FOR the most part the decisions which have been made in the discussion between the minister and the psychiatrist about the former's therapeutic role in the mental health field have been made at the practical level. Mental health is an infant field which has first of all challenged the parish minister. This has meant that he has had to embark on some new and often difficult reflection. In many instances he has collaborated with a local psychiatrist in his reflection, and the results of such intercommunication have helped the old profession and the new to move closer and closer toward a workable kind of cooperation.[1] Yet it is proper to ask whether the theoretical (or theological) roots of the discussion have not remained partially obscured because of involvement with immediate problems. Does not the practical situation need the distant reflection of the theorist? This article is written with the conviction that the answer to this question is Yes. What follows, therefore, is not an attempt to break new ground; rather it is an effort to deal with a much discussed subject—the minister's therapeutic role—from a position of relative detachment.[2]

I

We shall first attempt to describe what can be called the minister's self-understanding of his vocation. This is clearly the proper point of departure, rather than attempt to superimpose functions on the minister from the outside. We propose to center our attention on two familiar

1 An example of this is the Wellesley Human Relations Center, Wellesley, Mass. This is a pioneering organization which was founded by a psychiatrist and a minister and which affords parish ministers opportunity to work closely with a team of trained psychiatrists and psychologists.

2 This article is an adaptation of parts of a report for a seminar on religion and mental health given jointly by Harvard Divinity School and the Massachusetts Mental Health Center, Boston, Mass.

Greek words for love, agape and eros.[3] A phenomenological discussion centering around these two words will help to set the minister's vocational self-understanding in clear relief.

Agape is the love which is a gift to man; it does not belong to him. It is the love which grasps him from the outside and transforms him from the inside. It does not seek an object (an "it"); it gives itself to a subject (a "thou"). The source and ground of all agape was and is in him who was God's agape incarnate, Jesus of Nazareth, called the Christ. Here agape was made a viable fact of human existence which it was not before. When agape came into the world, furthermore, it was not forced on man. Rather it can be said that the power of agape was made available to man only if individual men would freely accept it. This is the telling point of Dostoevski's story of the Grand Inquisitor: the agape of God is so great that in giving himself, Christ will not come down from the cross; he will neither give men religion, nor will he give them bread. If he had done these things he would have been eros, not agape. Agape is a free gift, freely given, freely received. Agape is, moreover, a healing gift. It is that which makes men whole.[4] We shall return to this last point presently.

Agape, however, is not the love which abounds in the world. Men find it easy to reject agape because they are too engulfed in another kind of love, a love which is not self-giving, a love which is therefore easily accepted—eros. Eros is the love which belongs to the natural man. It is the love of that being who is essentially good in body and mind but who has willfully separated himself from the Ground of his essential goodness. To express this more concretely, eros is the love of that rebellious creature who has renounced his creaturely freedom in favor of a quest either for animality or for divinity, a quest which by the very nature of the case is doomed to failure. Eros perpetually seeks an object (an "it") which is consequential only in so far as it satisfies the desires of the lover. Whereas agape is always a free gift, eros, even in its veiled forms, is a gift with strings attached. Whereas agape

3 It will be clear that we have borrowed heavily in our discussion of agape and eros, but we do not want to lay the responsibility for our use of the distinction at the door of any one theologian.

4 "To make whole" is the basic meaning of the word "heal." In early Anglo-Saxon usage the most common form of the word was the present participle, "the healing one," employed as a translation for the name of Jesus. (See W. W. Skeat *Etymological Dictionary of the English Language,* 1956 ed.)

inherently will not and cannot coerce its subject, eros tends to be indifferent about the freedom of its object.[5]

Thus in the years after God's gift of agape in Jesus Christ, there are two "givens," whereas before there was only one. There is the ever-present eros and there is the possibility of agape. At times eros is permeated by agape and is lifted to a new dimension, the dimension of the truly human. At times eros completely overruns agape, and this can consistently lead only to the demonic.

Christians have sometimes made the error of assuming that they possess agape and others do not. The truth is, however, that no man (or group of men) can possess agape. This would be to make agape a function of eros, and this agape resists. The possibility of being transformed by agape is open to all men; it is hardly a Christian monopoly. However, since agape is not coercive, it is always threatened by eros. It is here that Christians have a role to play.

Christians are collectively the church of Christ, that is, the community of agape. In the church the respective positions of agape and eros, compared with what they are in the world, have been reversed. In the church agape has been accepted and it abounds. For this reason the source and ground of all agape, Jesus Christ, can be proclaimed to the world. This is, indeed, the historical mission to which the church has seen itself called. It is in the proclamation of the community of agape that Christ himself, God's agape incarnate, fights against eros and prevents it from being conqueror. This "fighting" takes the form of self-giving and sacrifice on the part of the church. The church of Christ is, so to say, the blood-red agapic thread which is woven in the complex erotic fabric of human history.

To move now to the minister's vocation: the minister is one member of the community of agape. He is different from other members only in so far as he is "servant to servants," that is, one whose particular function it is to be the voice of the community speaking to its individual members. Otherwise his vocation is the same vocation as that of every other Christian, namely, to bear witness in thought, word, and deed to the healing reality given to men as agape.

This, then, is the context of the minister's every act. His vocation

5 We cannot digress here to examine man's sexuality and to decide to what degree it is affected by eros. It must suffice to say that eros is a controlling factor in man's sexuality as in all areas of his life. The same can be said about the universal phenomenon of religion.

means total involvement. His whole life, like that of any Christian, is such that he *may* be one who is chosen to mediate God's agape to a person who needs this love. This was Luther's emphasis in the much misunderstood phrase, "the priesthood of all believers." Luther was not concerned to say merely that each Christian has direct access to God but rather that every Christian is a priest *to his neighbor,* that is, when a neighbor looks at the Christian, he does not see this or that particular person, but he sees Christ. In the language we have been using this can be expressed by saying that every Christian has the possibility of being chosen as the agent by whom God's healing agape may be mediated to the neighbor.

Even though the minister is a member of the community of agape and even though his vocation is to bear witness to agape, he is not therefore necessarily freed from eros. No radiance ever shines from him which is not at the same time a possible darkness. No good service is ever unambiguously good. No words from the pulpit are ever necessarily free from self-concern. Even the minister's greatest sacrifices can be motivated by pride. In other words, the minister is a sinner. This is a "diagnostic fact"[6] of human life which he easily forgets—only further evidence of his erotic constitution.

Yet if a minister is a sinner, he is a forgiven sinner. His life has been opened to agape as well as to eros. This is the significance of his standing within the community of agape. He and his brethren have been made whole even though they were and are sinful. This wholeness is not something which the minister or any other Christian possesses; rather, it is something which he may *live* in thought, word, and deed. In short, because his life has been touched by agape, the minister has the possibility of bearing witness to that very reality which has made him whole.

II

We may now draw some negative conclusions with regard to the minister's therapeutic role.

1. The minister cannot properly view advice-giving as one of his vocational functions, even though broad sectors of society expect the minister to be a source from which to attain advice. Advice-giving is

6 I owe this expression to Professor Paul L. Holmer, of the University of Minnesota.

always coercive; it removes a free decision and replaces it with tyranny —if the advice is accepted. Advice-giving is therefore inherently erotic. It rubs authoritarian salt into the wounds of the advice-seeker. It fashions him into an object.[7] The minister must resist the constant pressure to give advice because his vocation is to bear witness to that which can never be coercive, agape. We would even go so far as to suggest that he must withhold advice even from persons of lower social strata who only understand the language of authority.[8] If he labors, he can offer these persons an existential decision in free terms understandable to them, but advice, even when it is sought, cannot and must not be contemplated.

2. It has been suggested in certain circles that the minister's vocation is to be a "community caretaker."[9] This is not a happy phrase. A minister might be a caretaker, to use this figure, but he is not a passive sweeper of last night's remains, as the word implies. The minister is one who *seeks out* people and bears witness to God's agape. He does not, so to speak, sit back, relax, and light up his theological tobacco, waiting for some problem to knock on his door. His vocation is to bear witness to God's agape. To bear witness means to go out to people. Only because of his primary out-going do people come in to him. Perhaps a better word than "caretaker" is simply the more traditional "servant." This is what "minister" means in the first place.

3. The minister is not a "carrier of religious ideas," an expression used by sociologists. Unfortunately this may be a correct general description. Society expects the minister to be a reservoir of pious precepts, and this expectation is often fulfilled. But it must be clear that the phrase "carrier of religious ideas" cannot legitimately be applied to a minister in any prescriptive sense. The minister is interested in precepts or ideas only in so far as they lead him to the concrete human presupposition behind every thought. His concern is to bear witness to

7 *Advice-giving,* which presupposes an "it" and not a "thou," must of course be distinguished from *counseling* which preserves the I-Thou relationship. Where counseling becomes advice-giving in practice, it is unfortunately difficult to say. That there is a firm line between the two, however, there can be no doubt. (There is no need to quibble with the distinction on etymological grounds, because it is granted that they are, in this case, lacking.)

8 Problems of this kind are discussed throughout the most valuable study of A. B. Hollingshead and F. C. Redlich, *Social Class and Mental Illness* (New York, 1958).

9 See, for example, Donald C. Klein, "The Minister and Mental Health in Wellesley: an Evaluation," unpublished paper, Wellesley, Mass., August 12, 1958.

the new healing reality in Jesus Christ. This is a truly existential concern.

4. The minister is not primarily interested in morals, popular conceptions to the contrary notwithstanding. The minister bears witness in thought, word, and deed to God's agape, not to morality! Here Kierkegaard deserves our closest attention. The true Christian life, as he shows (especially in his discussion of Abraham), transcends morality. Certainly no one will suggest that Christian faith and morality are mutually exclusive. Yet the latter is only one possible avenue of bearing witness to agape. The minister, then, if he is true to his vocation, will not understand his primary function to be the maintenance of morality, but rather the witness to agape, a witness which goes beyond any morality.[10]

5. The minister's concern is never to proselyte. He bears witness, as we have repeatedly said, to the love of God in Jesus Christ. This love has nothing to do with proselyting because the latter is, like advice-giving, inescapably coercive, whether overtly or covertly. The goal of proselyting is to gain members for the cause of him who proselytes. He who proselytes—especially in a therapeutic situation—is an agent of the demonic. This is eros in all its untransformed force. The appropriate Christian word is not proselyting, but evangelism. Tragically enough, much of what parades under the banner of evangelism is in reality proselyting. Evangelism, however, is never coercive. How could it be? Its purpose is to proclaim God's agape. It offers men a free existential decision, the opportunity to say Yes or No in the depths of their being to God's great gift in Jesus Christ.

III

It is now our task to make some positive remarks about the minister's therapeutic role. It should be noted that we shall still be speaking from the vantage point of the minister's vocational self-understanding. Surveying human life from this vantage point, there seem to be two "diagnostic facts" which are of particular importance in our present context.

10 Karen Horney once noted (with not a little insight) that all religion is unavoidably moralistic. In this sense Christianity is not a religion. St. Paul and Luther were much more perceptive about this point than many enlightened psychiatrists. They knew that the law is a curse. *Pecca fortiter!*

The first is that *all* men suffer from "existential problems": sin, or untransformed eros, and the need for redemption, or agape. So intense and so universal are these problems that man himself cannot heal them. They must be healed from the outside by the wholly other, by God himself. In other words, the only solution for existential problems is God's agape. Only this will make men whole. There is one requirement, however, which must be fulfilled before this healing agape can be mediated: a man must come to recognize his creatureliness and the freedom of choice which goes with it.[11] He must reject the quest for divinity on the one hand or animality on the other. Only then can he accept (or reject) God's gift of agape.

The second diagnostic fact of human life with which we are concerned is that *some* men also suffer from "false problems": organic diseases and psychic disorders, particularly psychoses and the more severe neuroses. These problems are most certainly *real* problems, yet they are at the same time false problems. Their common characteristic is that they seem to keep the individual from completely coming to terms with the radical nature of his creaturely freedom. They seem to channel much of his energy to existentially unimportant areas of concern. They tend to make him prone to reject God's agape *a priori,* without ever allowing him to cope with agape's total significance.[12]

Because all men are not afflicted by false problems, moreover, those who do not so suffer have been able to arrive at a method for curing these problems. This method is commonly called "therapy." Therapy is not healing (in our sense) because it does not make men whole. Therapy is assisting or supporting an individual so that he is able to emerge from the grip of a false problem.[13] In other words, therapy is *not* the occasion for "that which is new" to enter into an individual's existential

11 A systematic statement would, of course, point to the fact that even man's coming to recognize his creatureliness is a work of God; in Luther's words, God's "strange work."

12 We are tentative here because the borderline between existential problems and false problems is so opaque, especially in some of the psychoneuroses. Also, it is difficult to say whether many of the organic diseases and some of the psychic disorders do deny the individual the possibility of acknowledging his creaturely freedom. We are not embarrassed by this tentativeness because we have not embarked on any attempt to describe ultimate principles; we are engaged in a phenomenological discussion which is tentative by its very nature.

13 The Greek root *ther-ap* means, literally, one who assists or supports. The image is conveyed by the English idiom "wait upon" when the latter refers to a household servant.

situation; rather, it attempts to *redistribute* elements already present.[14] Certainly from the Christian point of view therapy is ultimately rooted in the healing context of God's agape, but this is hidden except to eyes which view the situation from within the community of agape.[15]

As we have suggested, the minister's all-embracing concern is to bear witness to the healing agape of God. In view of the two diagnostic facts just examined, therefore, the minister is led to the conclusion—admittedly a conclusion based on risk—that in some cases therapy must be a part of his vocation. This is so because, as far as he can discern, one who is without therapy, when it is needed, may well never have occasion to say Yes or No to God's agape in the depths of his being. For this reason the minister may be acutely aware of the need for therapy in some cases. This awareness, of course, is not his primary mode of understanding any situation, but it does form part of the interpretive framework which he brings with him.[16] To repeat, the min-

14 The word "redistribute" is suggested by Ives Hendrick, *Facts and Theories of Psychoanalysis,* 3rd ed. (New York, 1958), p. 214. Part of his discussion is worth quoting at length: "The analyst's theory is that each individual is endowed with potentialities which cannot be altered by any therapist. Their most satisfactory realization is dependent upon the distribution of instinctual energy among those various systems of the personality structure which determine subjective experience, work, and relationships with other people. The total potential biological energy available for these functions of the organism which are mentally represented is constant for the individual and can be neither increased nor diminished by active interference. But the aims and modes of tension-release can be influenced. In neurosis and other personality difficulties an excessive amount of the total energy is absorbed by unconscious infantile problems, whose expression in greater or less degree produces 'abnormal' symptoms or character problems, limiting the patient's total satisfaction. Successful psychoanalytic therapy consists in effecting, not an addition or a subtraction, but a *redistribution* of energy, so that a significant reduction in the amount devoted to unconscious infantile objects, conflict, and the maintenance of repression results, and more is then available for mature, guiltless, less compulsive and stereotyped activities. . . ."

15 In this connection texts like John 10:16 and Luke 9:49-50 are suggestive.

16 It seems imperative that every minister in our day should be equipped with a thorough understanding of the insights of the psychoanalytic movement. How else will he be able to recognize a false problem? How else will he know when therapy is needed? To be sure, this is a dangerous kind of knowledge. We have in mind the very difficult task which the minister must perform: keeping psychoanalytic insights from becoming his primary mode of understanding a situation. This is a danger not because these insights, so employed, are necessarily false but because they tend to objectify human subjectivity; they tend to make a "thou" into an "it." In other words, psychoanalytic insights, useful as they may be, reliable as they may be, tend to stultify human spontaneity. Once a situation has been understood in psychoanalytic terms, certain expectations are created, certain limits are imposed.

It may well be that the minister who tries to understand every situation psychoanalytically is creating a block in front of his vocational responsibility, a block of theory which keeps him from understanding the situation as his vocation might require him to understand it. There is a suggestive similarity between this and the "dodge" sometimes used by an educated psychiatric patient: he uses psychoanalytic theory as a device to block insight into his own situation.

ister's mission is to search out people and proclaim God's love to them in thought, word, and deed. Part of this searching out is the minister's readiness to take appropriate action when a case requiring therapy presents itself. Perhaps it would be better to say, "when he *discovers* a need for therapy." The point is that the nature of his out-going vocation gives him opportunity to do therapy which otherwise might not be done.

There is, of course, more than one way for a minister to do therapy. Circumstances may force him to do the therapy himself. Or he may make the difficult decision that the therapy required can or even must be done by himself even though there are competent specialists available. Then again, a minister may do the therapy by referring the individual concerned to a specialist. The latter course, however, is clearly not always self-evident. In some instances hasty referrals conceivably could be occasion for a denial of vocational responsibility.

In any case, it is important that the minister always be *present* during the course of the therapy, whether he does it himself or, as is more usual, he refers it to another. "To be present" means here "to enjoy a personal relationship with the individual undergoing therapy, in so far as such a relationship is possible." This personal relationship gives the minister the opportunity to bear witness to God's agape whenever or wherever a situation might arise which makes this possible. Who is to say when, where, or how God may want to use the minister? One thing is sure: God cannot use him if he is not present.

It should be noted that the word "present" is used here very broadly. It must be recognized that the *form* of the minister's presence (or the form of the minister's opportunity to point to agape within the personal relationship) can never be predicted, and it can never be described afterwards. For this reason the statement, "This event is a witness to God's agape," cannot be made with any hope that it will correspond to reality. Such a statement attempts the impossible: to objectify agape. Hence no one, least of all the minister himself, can point to any action or word and suggest that this particular action and not that one can be considered to be a witness to God's agape. One point which needs to be made explicit at this juncture is that the minister's pointing

to agape need not be what society considers to be "religious."[17] To be sure, the minister may take the risk of using traditional Christian language in his conversations with the person undergoing therapy. On the other hand, he may never utter a word which can even be construed to be Christian or engage in any action—prayer, for instance—which will label him as "religious." The minister's witness-bearing may in fact be completely indistinguishable from the actions of other therapeutic personnel who may or may not be concerned with the individual undergoing therapy. Who is to say that at any time the minister's words and deeds are somehow indicative of God's agape and other people's are not? Again, the minister does not claim to have a monopoly on agape. He does not claim to possess agape. He asks only to be allowed to be able to fulfill his vocation by being present throughout the course of the therapy so that he might be called upon.

So broadly is the word "present" understood that we can and must go on to say that it is altogether possible that there will be occasions when a minister must take the risk of withdrawing from active contact with the person undergoing therapy so that the latter may test his own ability to cope with the world apart from any support the minister might have to offer. In this connection we may also recall our strictures against proselyting, especially in a therapeutic situation. So seriously must a minister take his vocation that he must continually resist the temptation of worldly success in his parish, particularly the constant pressure to gain more and more members. It may be that God's agape will lead the minister to allow individuals to break with the church, to become prodigals. Who can flout God's will in such a situation? Who can deny that it is God in his agape who will eventually bring the rebellious sons home? The minister with his erotic-conditioned vision—which cannot see into the future—must in these instances trust the straying sheep to the true Shepherd. God has his purposes to which the minister must also be obedient.

17 Hopefully we are not dealing with a religious robot which manufactures pious talk and distributes edifying literature along with saccharine smiles of condolence. Unfortunately many psychiatrists have accepted this caricature, though it cannot be altogether without foundation.

The Athanasian Meaning of "Being of One Substance with the Father"

By Robert W. Fox

WHAT does a Christian affirm to be true of God when he confesses that he believes that Jesus Christ as the Son of God is "of one substance with the Father"? Does he state anything at all which can be made part of an intelligible contemporary communication of the Gospel of Christ to the world at large? It is alleged on many sides that he does not. It is asserted that this formula of the Nicene Creed, as well as the theology from which it came and by which it was defended, depends for its meaning upon certain ontological presuppositions which are simply not acceptable today. While these may have been intelligible to the age in which the Nicene Creed was formulated, it is held that they convey no meaning to the modern mind, which thinks not in terms of a subject subsisting in itself, and of necessary and accidental qualification thereof, but in terms of actions, functions, events, and the like.

This is a charge which should be given close attention by those churches which still hold the Nicene Creed to be binding upon themselves. The church is under command to preach and teach the Gospel of Jesus Christ everywhere and at all times, and if it retains in its language a kind of speech which is no longer understood, not because it arises out of the Gospel itself but because it has its origin in a pagan philosophy now long since outmoded by the advancing sophistication of inquiring humanity, it seems fairly clear that effective fulfillment of that command by which the church itself was constituted will be seriously impaired.

The mere fact, however, that the Greek word *ousia,* from which the word *homoousion* in the Nicene Creed is derived, has a certain specific connotation when used in the language of Greek ontological inquiry is not evidence that it has the same meaning when used in the Nicene Creed or in the theology which sets it forth.

Generally speaking, the word *ousia* indicated to the Greek philosophical mind a way of speaking about an intelligible subject by which

something could be understood of what that subject is in and of itself, by a certain rational comprehension of its being, quite distinct from what it is empirically observed to be or to do. Although not every Greek philosopher understood the term in exactly the same manner, Aristotle's use of the term seems to have been fairly representative. "Substance" (*ousia*) was held by him to mean what a subject is (*to ti esti*) apart from any qualification of it by such categories as quality, quantity, or affection[1]—in other words, apart from such attributes as are known of it in the immediacy of sense experience.

To apply this way of thinking to knowledge of God, then, would seem to suggest that something of what God is in and of himself and distinct from his becoming known to man through his acts can be rationally apprehended by the abstracting processes of the human mind. If in stating that Christ is "of one substance with the Father" one states a proposition which has no meaning except that it be understood in connection with an ontological inquiry into the nature of God in and of himself, perhaps objection to the use of the Nicene formula ought to be sustained, and that even on further grounds than that it is not congruent with the categories of modern thought.

First, it would seem to suggest that man is somehow capable of attaining, by a rational formula of his own devising, a knowledge of God which is somehow greater and more accurate than that which he has when he stands before the mighty works of God and is moved to wonder and adoration. To reduce him of whom it is said, "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God," to some such formula as "God is eternal essence and prior to created substances" is rightly thought to work confusion rather than clarification if such a proposition is indeed held to state a truth about God as he is in himself and abstractly apprehended by the logical faculty of the human mind.

Further, if the Nicene Creed statement concerning Christ is necessarily understood as speaking of God in the manner of Greek ontological speculation, it may well be a justifiable objection that to insist upon its use appears to suggest that to be a Christian one must not only believe in Christ, but must also accept as intellectually binding upon him a state-

1 Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* VII, i, 1.

ment about Christ which depends for its validity upon the authoritative adoption of the criteria of one particular philosophical discipline. Thus Nicene Christianity is made liable to a charge that it is subversive of that freedom of the mind without which the pursuit of philosophical truth cannot take place.

But, as stated above, the mere fact that the term *ousia* and a word derived from it are found in the creed set forth at Nicaea does not of itself establish that the Fathers who adopted it meant it as an ontological term. Both the present English word "substance" and the fourth-century Greek word *ousia* have and can have meanings other than that given to them in speculative ontology; and if the Nicene Fathers did not intend it to have such a meaning, the present-day charge that it does have an unacceptable ontological connotation might perhaps be found to be based on something like a reading back into Nicene theology an interpretation which was not given to it until a much later date.

Since it was the heroic and single-minded determination of Athanasius to maintain the faith of Nicaea against those who attacked it which, probably more than anything else, brought it about that the Nicene Creed was finally accepted by the church generally, his way of understanding the Nicene statement is very likely to be the way it was understood by those in the church who adhered to it in his day.

Athanasius seems to have been quite well aware of the dangers involved in attempting to express a truth of the Christian Gospel in terms taken from a philosophical discipline enjoying contemporary currency, for he seems at one point to have tried very hard to deny that the word *ousia,* as used in the Nicene formulae, had a connotation of the sort now known as ontological. The important passage where he does this is section 22 of the defense of the Nicene definition, known as *De Decretis.* In this passage Athanasius quotes the formula *ek tes ousias tou Patros* rather than *homoousion to Patri,* but as can be seen from his statement in section 23 concerning the latter,[2] he considered the same argument equally applicable to that formula. The former was subsequently dropped from the Nicene Creed and only the latter retained. Athanasius himself uses other formulae, such as "proper to the essence of the Father," and many variations thereof, but having the same

2 *De Decr.* 23 (p. 165). Page references in parentheses are to Vol. IV of *A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers* (ed. Schaff and Wace, 1892).

meaning as those in the Nicene Creed. Since *homoousion to Patri* is the only one current today, everything said here may be taken as applicable to it.

The passage referred to is as follows:

> But if God be simple, as he is, it follows that in saying "God" and naming "Father" we name nothing as if about him, but signify his essence itself. For though to comprehend what the essence of God is be impossible, yet if we only understand that God is, and if Scripture indicates him by means of these titles, we, with the intention of indicating him and none else, call him God and Father and Lord. When then he says, "I am that I am" and "I am the Lord God," or when Scripture says, "God," we understand nothing else by it but the intimation of his incomprehensible essence itself, and that he is who is spoken of. Therefore let no one be startled on hearing that the Son of God is from the essence of the Father; but rather let him accept the explanation of the Fathers, who in more explicit but equivalent language have for "from God" written "of the essence." For they considered it the same thing to say that the Word was "of God" and "of the essence of God," since the word "God," as I have already said, signifies nothing but the essence of him who is.[3]

It is clear that Athanasius here intends to give the word *ousia* a meaning other than that which it has in Greek ontological speculation. Even though he begins the passage by using of God the ontological predicate "simple," his use of this term no less than his use of the term *ousia* gives it a connotation which is quite other than ontological. To say that God is "simple" is for Athanasius here merely to say that nothing may be known about him, but only that he is. Ordinarily, in Greek ontological thought to say that a substance is simple is to assert that much can be known about it,[4] and Athanasius in his earlier works has used this or a similar concept of God with a clear ontological connotation, which he now at least by inference rejects, as will be discussed hereafter. And to state that "to comprehend what the essence of God is to be impossible," and that by the subject "God" one signifies only him who is, shows at the very least an earnest attempt to overcome the ontological connotations of the term *ousia* in this context.

The result then seems to be that unless the word *ousia* is just a redundancy here, meaning nothing more than the word *esti* indicates of God, it will be necessary for Athanasius to re-invest the word with

3 *De Decr.* 22 (p. 165).

4 See, e.g., Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII, xvii, 7; IX, x, 4, 7; XII, vii, 3.

meaningful content and at the same time avoid returning to it the connotation it would ordinarily have in Greek ontological speech. If he is not able to do this by his subsequent use of the word, the above-quoted paragraph may simply have to be written off as superfluous.

In contrast to what he attempts here in the passage quoted, his youthful essays, *Contra Gentes* and *De Incarnatione Verbi Dei* (which shall be hereafter referred to as the "Christological essays"), written by Athanasius before he had encountered the necessity of defending the Nicene formulations against the attacks upon them by his Arian opponents, show no attempt whatever to transcend the ontological categories of Greek thought. Hence, to set the fundamental principles of the Christological essays over against those found in his more mature thought, as this appears in the works by which he defends the Nicene definitions (hereafter referred to as the "polemical works," of which shall be considered passages from the *De Decretis* and the first and third *Discourses Against the Arians*), might yield insight into whether, in the polemical works, Athanasius really succeeds in using the phrase "of the essence of God" in such a way that it is meaningful and yet does not depend for its connotation upon the mode of its use in Greek ontological language. That is, the question to be asked is whether in the polemical works Athanasius alters his methodology in such a manner that the ontological principles of Greek thought are now no longer necessary presuppositions to the theological conclusions to which he comes.

It is of the highest importance for Athanasius to maintain a clear distinction in thought between God and the created universe, and it is his chief criticism of both Greek philosophy and of Arianism that they do not do this, but are constantly confusing the attributes of one with the attributes of the other. In the Christological essays the distinction he maintains is clearly an ontological one, and his use of it there is such that it is impossible to understand it in any other way.

In these essays Athanasius is primarily concerned with the concept of Jesus Christ as the incarnate Word of God. Although, as stated, his thought in these essays is dependent upon certain ontological principles, yet he does go beyond these even here, though he does not reject them. His concept of the Word of God, as he develops it, is not itself ontological but rather a dynamic concept. The Word of God is that of God by which he does what he does—that is, by which he creates,

governs his creation, reveals himself in his creation and specially by the incarnate Word, and redeems mankind. This is set forth by Athanasius in sections 40 and 41 of the *Contra Gentes:*

> But by Word I mean not that which is involved and inherent in all things created, . . . but I mean the living and powerful Word of the good God, the God of the universe, the very Word which is God, who, while different from things that are made, and from all creation, is the one own Word of the good Father, who by his own providence ordered and illumines this universe. For being the good Word of the good Father, he produced the order of all things, combining one thing with another contrary and reducing them to one harmonious order. Being the power of God and wisdom of God, he causes the heaven to revolve, and by his own nod has suspended the earth, and made it fast, though resting upon nothing.
>
> . . . But God possesses true existence and is not composite, wherefore his Word also has true existence and is not composite, but is the one and only-begotten God, who proceeds in his goodness from the Father as from a good fountain, and orders all things and holds them together. But the reason why the Word, the Word of God, has united himself with created things is truly wonderful, and teaches us that the present order of things is none otherwise than is fitting. . . . Seeing then all created nature, as far as its own laws are concerned, to be fleeting and subject to dissolution, lest it should come to this and lest the universe should be broken up again into nothingness, for this cause he made all things by his own eternal Word and gave substantive existence to creation, . . . but, because he is good he guides and settles the whole creation by his own Word, who is himself also God, that by the governance and providence and ordering action of the Word, creation may have light and be enabled to abide always securely.[5]

The above passage illustrates quite adequately the sort of reasoning of which the Christological essays are made up. While there seems to be little doubt that Athanasius is concerned most of all to affirm principles which arise out of the Christian Gospel, such as the goodness of God, his active providence in his creation, and the security of the creation in him, and that he goes beyond the ontological and cosmological principles he affirms to a dynamic conception of the providential action of God in his Word, these further affirmations are nevertheless methodologically dependent upon principles taken from an ontological and cosmological system which, it can readily be seen, would not be considered tenable today. No audience would be gained from the modern mind by

5 *Contra Gentes* 40.4, 5; 41 (pp. 25-26).

an attempt to establish the goodness of God and his active providence by arguing from a cosmology based on such principles as the combination of opposites, the ordered harmony of the universe, the tendency of created substances toward dissolution and passage into non-being, and the distinction between God as simple substance (here called "not composite") and created things as composite substances.

This dependence upon Greek ontological principles carries through in the Christological essays even into what Athanasius has to say concerning the redemptive work of God in Christ as well. Again, an ontological distinction between God and created things, here the attributes of corruptibility and incorruptibility as characteristic, the one of simple substance and the other of composite substances, is an indispensable premise to the affirmations Athanasius makes concerning Christ.

In so far as he is part of material creation, man is of a corruptible nature. But unlike other created beings, he is created in the image of God and has a rational soul and a free will. He partakes of the Word of God in order that he may have knowledge of God and may receive from him the gift of incorruptibility.[6] Through sin, man has lost the capability of knowing God and has incurred the penalty of death, that is, God has given him over to subjection to the tendency toward dissolution into non-being which is his lot as a part of created nature.[7] Christ's redemptive work is conceived of as an arresting of man's flight toward non-existence.[8] Christ pays the penalty of death on behalf of all men, restores the possibility of incorruptibility to their nature,[9] and makes them once again capable of contemplating God by himself becoming God incarnate in a human body, so that even through the knowledge attained by the senses man may obtain an idea of God.[10]

Thus in the Christological essays everything depends upon the assertion of an ontological distinction between God and the created universe, having to do with the simple substance of God and the attribute of incorruptibility over against the composite substances of created things and the attribute of corruptibility. And in the polemical works, no less than in the Christological essays, it is a fundamental concern of

6 *De Incarn.* 3.3, 4; 4.5 (pp. 37-38).
7 *De Incarn.* 4.4 (p. 38).
8 *De Incarn.* 6 (p. 39).
9 *De Incarn.* 21 (p. 47).
10 *De Incarn.* 15, 16 (pp. 44-45).

Athanasius to maintain a distinction between God and the created universe. What this distinction is in the polemical works will be crucial for the meaning of the Nicene formulae *homoousion to Patri* and *ek tes ousias tou Patros* as well as for the meaning of the formula *idios tes tou Patros ousias* and its variations, since Athanasius indicates that the express purpose of these formulae is to maintain this highly important distinction.[11]

The clearest statement of the distinction Athanasius intends to maintain by these formulae comes in the latter part of the *De Decretis,* where Athanasius is contending against the adoption of the term "unoriginate" as a designation of God, which term was apparently suggested by some of the Arian party as an alternative to the Nicene formulations. His objection to the use of that term is based upon the assertion that, while "unoriginate" does indeed refer to something true of God, it is nevertheless not adequate in that it names God after his creation and only signifies that he is the maker of the universe,[12] whereas God ought to be called, not "unoriginate" after his works, but "Father" through the Son:

> Therefore it will be much more accurate to denote God from the Son and to call him Father, than to name him and call him unoriginated from his works only; for the latter term refers to the works that have come to be at the will of God through the Word, but the name of Father points out the proper offspring from his essence. And whereas the Word surpasses things originated, by so much and more also doth calling God Father surpass the calling him unoriginated; for the latter is non-scriptural and suspicious, as it has various senses; but the former is simple and scriptural and more accurate, and alone implies the Son. And "unoriginated" is a word of the Greeks who know not the Son: but "Father" has been acknowledged and vouchsafed by our Lord.[13]

Here is the distinction to be maintained by the Nicene formulae. It replaces the ontological distinction between God as simple substance and created things as composite substances which was so important in the Christological essays. Henceforth that distinction is no longer relevant in view of what Athanasius says here and in the passage

11 *De Decr.* 19, 20 (pp. 163, 164); *Orat.* i. 19, 29 (pp. 317, 323, 324).

12 *De Decr.* 29, 30 (pp. 170-171).

13 *De Decr.* 31 (p. 171). This passage is repeated almost word for word in *Orat.* i. 34 (p. 326).

quoted above from section 22 of the *De Decretis*. Nor will it be possible any longer for Athanasius to premise affirmations of the goodness of God and his active providence upon cosmological and ontological principles such as the combination of opposites into the ordered harmony of the universe, if his discourse is to be consistent with his rejection here of inference from the nature of the universe as a mode of designating anything about God except that he is "unoriginate" and is the maker of the universe.

From this point onward such principles as the goodness of God and his providence must fall within the knowledge of God that is "acknowledged and vouchsafed by our Lord." The distinction now maintained is no longer an ontological one, as in the Christological essays, but a distinction between knowledge of God attained by inference from the nature of the universe, by which it can be known only that God is "unoriginate" and maker of the universe, and the knowledge of God vouchsafed by our Lord Jesus Christ. In a word, the theology of Athanasius now becomes wholly Christocentric, to the exclusion of ontological speculation into the nature of God.

To be sure, Athanasius does continue to use ontological terminology and to allude to ontological principles such as those maintained in the Christological essays. These are used, however, not as premises from which knowledge of God in Christ is inferred, but as arguments to counter the ontological arguments of his Arian opponents. The conclusions concerning God and his redemptive work in Christ to which Athanasius arrives in the *Discourses Against the Arians* are not premised upon and are not logically dependent upon ontological principles but arise solely from the Christocentric position taken here in the *De Decretis*.

Over and over again Athanasius maintains in these discourses that it is in Christ that knowledge of God the Father is attained, and it is clear that it is this, and this only, that he is concerned to safeguard by the affirmation that Christ is "of the essence of the Father."

> If, then, as we have stated and are showing, what is the offspring of the Father's essence be the Son, we cannot hesitate, rather we must be certain, that the same is the wisdom and Word of the Father, in and through whom he creates and makes all things; and his brightness, too, in whom he enlightens all things, and is revealed to whom he will; and his expression and image also, in whom he is

contemplated and known, wherefore "he and his Father are one," and whoso looketh on him, looketh on the Father; and the Christ, in whom all things are redeemed, and the new creation wrought afresh.[14]

For this is why he who hath seen the Son hath seen the Father, and why the knowledge of the Son is knowledge of the Father.[15]

As always, Athanasius points to the works of God, and now it becomes the works wrought in Christ, rather than those manifested in the universe, which are all important.

Thus "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself," for the propriety of the Father's essence is that Son in whom the creation was then reconciled with God. Thus what things the Son then wrought are the Father's works, for the Son is the form of that Godhead of the Father which wrought the works.[16]

What the work of Christ is by which God himself is known to man, and why it is of such vital importance to maintain the affirmation of faith that God himself is known to men in Christ, is made very clear in the following summary statement:

For God is always, and one and the same; but men have come to be afterwards through the Word, when the Father himself willed it; and God is invisible and inaccessible to originated things, and especially to men upon earth. When then men in infirmity invoke him, when in persecution they ask help, when under injuries they pray, then the Invisible, being a lover of man, shines forth upon them with his beneficence, which he exercises through and in his proper Word. And forthwith the divine manifestation is made to everyone according to his need, and is made to the weak health, and to the persecuted a "refuge" and "house of defense"; and to the injured he says, "While thou speakest I will say, Here I am." Whatever defense then comes to each through the Son, that each says that God has come to be to himself, since succor comes from God himself through the Word. . . . When the saints say concerning God, "He became" and "become thou," they do not denote any original becoming, for God is without beginning and unoriginate, but the salvation which is made to be unto men from him.[17]

This for Athanasius is the meaning of the Incarnation and the heart of the Gospel, that God who is, and is eternally the same, in

14 *Orat.* i. 16 (p. 316).
15 *Orat.* i. 35 (p. 327).
16 *Orat.* iii. 6 (p. 396).
17 *Orat.* i. 63 (pp. 342-343).

Jesus Christ becomes what men in their infirmity need of him. Nor does the theology of Athanasius come to rest within the category either of being or of becoming, thus making the efficacy of the Christian Gospel dependent upon the outcome of the dispute between Heraclitus and the Eleatics, a settlement of which after some twenty-five centuries is not yet in prospect. Athanasius goes on to the specifically evangelical category, which includes both being and becoming, and more, the category of *gift*. The meaning of the Gospel is not merely that God is or that he becomes but that he *gives* himself in Christ to men who need him.

> For through the Son is given what is given; and there is nothing but the Father operates it through the Son; for thus is grace secure to him who receives it.[18]
>
> For thus the blessing was secure, because of the Son's individuality from the Father, and for that the grace given by them is one and the same. For though the Father gives it, through the Son is the gift; and though the Son be said to vouchsafe it, it is the Father who supplies it through and in the Son; for "I thank my God," says the Apostle writing to the Corinthians, "always on your behalf for the grace of God which is given you in Christ Jesus."[19]

This, then, is the Athanasian meaning of the formula *homoousion to Patri*: that when men in their infirmity come to know that God giving himself in Jesus Christ has become their salvation, they know that the gift is secure; that because Jesus Christ is indivisibly one with the Father, the security of the gift depends not upon any of the contingencies involved in the event of the giving, but solely upon the eternal and unchangeable will and love of God the Father who gives it.

The modern mind yet hesitates, however, and asks questions which are not answered in the theology of Athanasius since, of course, they were not asked in his day. If there are events of God's giving himself in Jesus Christ, not only the events of Christ's life on earth itself but all the events by which that is and has been made relevant to the lives of men throughout the nineteen centuries thereafter, why not affirm something concerning them as well as, if not rather than, concerning the relationship of Jesus Christ to God the Father? It is, after all, the method of inquiry of the modern mind to investigate the events associated with anything it wishes to know and to ground its affirmations upon the re-

18 *Orat.* iii. 12 (p. 400).
19 *Orat.* iii. 13 (p. 401).

sults of such investigation. Why should the Christian Gospel not be subjected to this as well? If the meaning of the Nicene formula is not understood apart from the event of God's giving himself in Jesus Christ, is not the formula itself only half true or half meaningful without the event?

This is admitted; but note that it is not here stated that the meaning of the formula is completed by something about the meaning of the event. It is stated that the meaning of the formula is not complete without the event itself. The way to make the Nicene formula meaningful, then, is not to affirm it in conjunction with an affirmation of something about the event, but to affirm it at the time that the event itself is made to happen. And the church knows very well what these events are. It has many commands and many promises: the preaching of the Word, the administration of the sacraments, prayer and adoration, acts of obedience in love—these and many other events are brought within the promise, "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world."

And this suggests that perhaps the problem was slightly misstated right in the beginning. Christians who acknowledge the Nicene Creed do not merely state *that* they believe *that* Jesus Christ is of one substance with the Father. What they actually do is to say, during an *act* of adoration and confession, "I believe . . . in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, begotten of his Father before all worlds, God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father, through whom all things were made: who, for us men, and for our salvation, came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the virgin Mary, and was made man."

The Exposition of Sin in the Sermons of John Donne

By W. William Kuhre

THE seventeenth century is marked by several curiosities which direct it to the attention of both those who proclaim and those who hear the Christian kerygma. That century has a curious place in English literary history. The sensibilities had shifted, slowly perhaps, but definitely, from Elizabethan to Jacobean. The so-called metaphysicals, rather unlike the philosophical metaphysicians, aimed toward what Dr. Johnson called entertaining "the most heterogeneous ideas . . . yoked together by violence." What characterized the main writers of the day were the "strong lines," those seeming paradoxes of sense and soul, body and spirit, frequently convulsed by the force of revelation. (Those who have proclaimed the Christian good news have not usually been strange to such convulsions!) John Donne is generally conceived to be the master of the school. As a poet Donne was able to unify seemingly fractured, to continue seemingly discontinuous, ideas and sensations and points of view. This is Donne the poet, author of the *Satyres*. But between the Donne of the *Satyres* and the preaching Donne of St. Paul's there is no accountable difference. The conceits of the sermons and those of the poems may have a tempo and an intensity different one from the other; yet the main shift is in their direction rather than in their form or even in their content.

And this suggests that the religious concerns of the century underwent changes similar to the literary concerns. When one reads a Donne sermon or a Herbert poem, one wants to conclude that the seventeenth century in England also has a curious place in "holy history." Even as "holy history" so bothers historians of one aeon only, quite as strongly that sort of history (and its seventeenth century) ought constantly catch the attention of theologians. The sensibilities had shifted from the so-called medieval synthesis, so very reasonable and respectable, to the Reformation doctrines of God and man. True, those doctrines usually had a catholic nature about them; but they were evangelical too, uneasy

and paradoxical in the tension of sin and grace, of the theanthropic One, of the *Deus revelatus* and the *Deus absconditus*. Europe had passed through the *Institutes* of Calvin and through the prophetic-critical tracts of Luther as well as through the less responsible polemics of the sectarians and enthusiasts.

By the seventeenth century, there were two tendencies in English and continental theology: the first, to orthodoxy of a solid sort, to the embrace of the faith—"Universall, Catholique, beleeved by all," as Donne puts it; the second, to a liberalism arising from the great age of man, from deism, and from a generous quality of disbelief.[1] The first tendency has special significance for students of the Christian faith in our time. The Thirty-nine Articles and the German Concordia had already been presented to the faithful. It was now a matter of tracing through the new dislocations in systematics—of examining how precisely the universal priesthood applied (if it did apply in the English Church, and many were quite willing to swear that it did); of how precisely man could be *simul iustus et peccator;* of how precisely man could live, and maintain his sanity, in those two biblically described aeons of grace and sin, of holy and profane warfare.

I should like to show here something of John Donne's teaching about sin as it appears in his sermons, the relevancy of which continues to address us urgently. Particularly I wish to examine Donne's biblical and catholic point of view that sin is man's proud attempt to contradict God and, by so doing, man's ultimate contradiction of himself. I shall then consider the forms which sin assumes according to Donne. Finally I shall examine how closely Donne seems to follow the classic Reformation insight into the sin which lingers in the life of the redeemed, the teaching *simul iustus et peccator,* over which no merit other than Christ's can grant victory.

The Origin of Sin and Its Nature as Pride

In an early sermon preached at Lincoln's Inn in the spring of 1618, Donne wants very much to show the origin of sin and the particular ways in which sin crops out in the human adventure. His text is Ps. 38:2, "For Thine Arrowes Stick Fast in Me, and Thy Hand

1 For a quick indication of seventeenth century theological liberalism see William P. Dunn, *Sir Thomas Browne* (Minneapolis, 1950), pp. 45-53.

presseth Me Sore." This text tells us that God not only feeds us, and that with marrow and fatness, but in his wisdom he permits us mortification. God permits his judgments and chastening to be worked out upon us through what he sends. This is the setting for the sermon; and we hear the words:

> So that these arrows which are lamented here, are all those miseries, which sinne hath cast upon us; *Labor,* and the childe of that, *Sicknesse,* and the off-spring of that, *Death;* and the *security* of conscience, and the *terrour* of conscience; the *searing* of the conscience, and the *over-tendernesse* of the conscience; Gods quiver, and the Devils quiver, and our own quiver, and our neighbours quiver, afford, and furnish arrows to gall, and wound us.[2]

The arrows in the text proceed from sin, and the sin proceeds from temptations and induces tribulations. The preacher goes to some length to investigate the categories of the tribulations; but as a careful preacher, he is not content merely to describe an activity of sin and its consequences in mortifications and chastenings. He must, for his own benefit and for that of his congregation, go to the heart of the matter. He must find sin's origin.

The theological problem of sin's origin had always vexed the church. Major heresies had developed as a result of the consideration, as a result of the inability to resolve the seeming paradox between the good divine act of creation and the evil human act of rebellion. The Manichaeans, the gnostic sects had faced the problem and broken down under its weight into a conception of two gods, two forces of good and of evil.[3] Classic statements of the problem had, however, usually been content to stand by the authority of the Scriptures, defined by the church, and to describe the appearance of sin in history. There is some indication that the Christian doctrine of sin was watered down from its biblical (especially Pauline) strength as the treasure of the church moved from a fundamentally Hebraic milieu to that of the Greco-Roman world. A chief complaint of the Reformation was that this had happened among certain of the Fathers, not including Augustine of course, and among the schoolmen. The Reformation set about rectifying

2 *The Sermons of John Donne,* ed. George R. Potter and Evelyn M. Simpson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), II, pp. 55, 56. Hereafter cited as *Sermons.*

3 In an Easter Monday sermon, Donne repudiates the attempt of Marcion to create two gods, one good and one evil. *Sermons,* IV, 94.

this situation with a cry of dereliction decidedly more significant to the movement than any political or social causes.

Donne seems to stand within the context of this Reformation move. In an extensive paragraph on the Holy Ghost's metaphor of "arrowes" (the same text as above, Ps. 32:2), Donne considers the "Quia volces" of the text: how sin's captivation of man comes upon us so swiftly, so impetuously.

In the generation of *our parents,* we were *conceiv'd in sin;* that is, they sinn'd in that action; so we were conceiv'd in sinne; in *their sin.* In *our selves,* we were submitted to sin, in that very act of generation, because then we became in part the subject of *Originall Sin.* Yet, there was no arrow shot *into* us then; there was no sinne in that *substance* of which we were made; for if there had been sin in that *substance,* that substance might be damn'd, though God should never infuse a soul into it. . . . Here's no sin in *that* soul, that God creates, for there God should create something that were *evill;* and that cannot be said: Here's no arrow shot from the body, no sin in the *body alone;* None from the soul, no sin in the *soul alone;* And yet, the *union* of this soul and this body is so accompanied with Gods *malediction* for our first transgression, that in the instant of that *union* of life, as certainly as that *body must die,* so certainly *the whole Man* must be guilty of *Originall sin.* No man can tell me out of what *Quiver,* yet here is an arrow comes so swiftly, as that in the very first minute of our life, in our quickening in our mothers womb, wee become guilty of *Adams* sin done 6000 years before, and subject to all those arrows, *Hunger, Labour, Grief, Sicknesse,* and *Death,* which have been shot after it. This is the fearfull swiftnesse of this arrow, that *God himself* cannot get before it. In the first minute that my soul is infus'd, the Image of God is imprinted in my soul; so forward is God in my behalf, and so early does he visit me. But yet *Originall sin* is there, as soon as that Image of God is there. My soul is capable of *God,* as soon as it is capable of *sin;* and though sin doe not get the start of God, God does not get the start of sin neither. Powers, that dwell so far asunder, as *Heaven,* and *Hell, God* and the *Devill,* meet in an instant in my soul, in the minute of my quickning, and the Image of *God,* and the Image of *Adam,* Originall sin, enter into me at once, in one, and the same act. So swift is this arrow, *Originall sin,* from which, all arrows of subsequent tentations, are shot, as that God, who comes to my first minute of life, cannot come before death.[4]

Donne is making a sharp argument for an Augustinian conception of man's participation in the Fall. In the Pelagian controversy Augustine held that man's fall is in the truest sense a deprivation of nature; while man was destined for life, therefore, he goes toward death. For

4 *Sermons,* II, 58-59, Cf. II, 76, 88-90.

Pelagius the Fall was a mere something gone wrong with man, a privation of man's better nature, a following in the misguided footsteps of Adam. For Augustine the Fall involved a radical perversion of man's self, a deep contradiction within the very nature of existence which could not be ameliorated by any cultural enlightenment or by the highest possible human imitation of Christ.

Orthodox theology, following St. Paul and Augustine, active in Luther and other evangelical theologians during the 1500's, had maintained that the essential goodness of man, destroyed by "Adam," could be restored only by the Second Adam, our Lord himself. Having taken a serious view of the biblical doctrine of creation, orthodoxy did not fall into the danger of making sin a result of corporeality. As certain theological schools moved from a basically biblical world view to Greek and Western thought patterns, the integrity of God's creative act was sacrificed for a metaphysical dualism. This dualism may not have been formally and systematically taught, but it became more and more apparent in the church until finally, having assumed really dangerous proportions, the church had to act in council to arrest the heresy. Obviously, since the flesh is none too solid anyway, the tendency to hold it as evil lingered; the Christian mystics, especially of medieval times, came too close for orthodox comfort to the heretical position.

One must know this pattern before one can sense how closely Donne follows the path of orthodoxy. He clearly guards against assigning sin's pollution to our "substance," our flesh.[5] Sin is neither of the body nor of the spirit separately, but the whole man is guilty and exhibits symptoms of that disease. Outside of all reason, but quite within the accounting of human experience, we perceive the infiltration of powers, the image of God and the image of Adam.

This may not be especially convincing to those who scoff. And without question, we should like a more detailed account of how man "gets that way." But it is significant that Donne does no more, nor less, in his exposition of sin's origin than do those two confessions of his

5 Donne refuses again and again to succumb to the temptation of equating sinfulness with corporeality. Christ, he says, did not die to make the body everything, nor did he die to annihilate it. The post-resurrection appearance to Peter "was not a glorifying of the body, and making it *thorough light;* but hee suffered his *Divine nature* to appeare and shine thorough his *flesh,* and not to swallow, or annihilate that flesh." *Sermons,* III, 354. In a sermon preached at Lincoln's Inn, Donne disclaims the heresy of refusing the appropriate rights which God grants to the body. *Sermons,* III, 14 ff.

age, the Thirty-nine Articles of the English Church (Article IX) and the Augsburg Confession (Articles II and IX, with their counterparts in the Apology). His division of the text, his argument, satisfied Donne. So it must all those who interpret sin as the ineluctable mystery of man's relationship with the Creator and as the necessity for the first-order paradox of the Christian faith, the Incarnation.[6] What we were meant to be, we become in spite of ourselves, in spite of sin's power, only because of the God-man. This is a matter of faith and not of rationalized proof.

Yet for all sin's mystery, perhaps even the faithful want clear exposition of sin's rise. Donne presents us with a somewhat more detailed exposition in two sermons preached at Whitehall on the same day, April 19, 1618. In characteristic fashion, he proceeds from the biblical text, through the Fathers, to the formal application of the text, I Tim. 1:15, "This is a Faithful Saying, and Worthy of All Acceptation, That Christ Jesus Came into the World to Save Sinners; of Which I Am the Chiefest." As one may quickly gather from the text, the two sermons from it are to be most concerned with the foreordained glory and blessedness which is won for Christ's people on account of his merits. But such an end cannot be conceived except we consider the why of Christ's coming, the sin which brought him into the world. The sermon develops the plan according to "holy history." Donne leads us into the full view of God's plan in creation, of how the creature perverted his place in creation, of God's action through the patriarchs, the prophets, and finally in the Word himself. In developing this matter, Donne must pay special attention to the miserable condition of man. He does so; but, and importantly, he does so quite within the context of grace. Therefore one ought note that Donne is thereby saved both from the despair of cynicism and from the naivete of humanism.

> The preacher observes that our "dead will" is restored again . . . by his Grace precedent and subsequent, and concommitant: for, without such Grace and such succesion of Grace, our Will is so far unable to pre-dispose it selfe to any good, as that *nec seipso, homo, nisi perniciose uti potest* (sayes he still) we have no interest in our selves, no power to doe anything of, or with our selves, but to our destruction. Miserable man! a Toad is a bag of Poyson, and a Spider a blister of Poyson, and yet a Toad and a Spider cannot poyson themselves; Man hath a dram of poyson, originall-Sin, in an invisible corner, we know not where, and he cannot

6 Cf. Donne's affirmation of such a necessity in *Sermons*, I, 304.

choose but poyson himselfe and all his actions with that; we are so far from being able to begin without Grace, as then where we have the first Grace, we cannot proceed to the use of that, without more.[7]

We are all wrapped up in the first Adam and bear the consequences of our wrapping; but we shall be wrapped up in the Second Adam and have the gift of Grace.

Before any consent of ours be actually given to any Sin, we are the children of wrath, and of death; but we are not so in the second *Adam*, as that we are made possessors of eternall life, without the concurrence of our own Will; not that our will payes one penny towards this purchase, but our own will may forfeit it; it cannot adopt us, but it may disinherit us.[8]

The anti-Pelagian nature of Donne's sin punctuates with a sharp note his prophetic and evangelical protest in the great Pelagian age of *homo* in England, the age of deism, of Lord Herbert of Cherbury, of the cynicism of Hobbes, of the sweet reasonableness of Bacon. The age was proud of man able to tackle the world and to conquer its mysteries. *The Advancement of Learning* is a testimony to this belief in man. Though Bacon had a humility before an almighty God which is not always easy to discover in his Renaissance successors, his *Advancement* witnesses more to man's power for glory than to his equally significant failure. Mark his contrast with Donne: "It is without all controversy, that learning doth make the minds of men gentle, generous, maniable, and pliant to government; whereas ignorance makes them churlish, thwart, and mutinous. . . ."[9]

Bacon and men like him may see the vanities and peccant humors of the species; but under their glass these would appear as essentially Pelagian categories. Donne sees the situation of man rather differently. In a digest of notes on a sermon dated December 19, 1619, we have these observations on the nature of a pride less glorious than that usually offered by Donne's century:

So early, so primary a sin is pride, as that, out of every mercy, and blessing, which God affords us (and, *His mercies are new every morning*), we gather Pride;

7 *Sermons*, I, 293.
8 *Loc. cit.* Cf. II, 210.
9 Francis Bacon, *The Advancement of Learning* (London: Oxford University Press, 1906), p. 18.

wee are not the more thankfull for them, and yet we are the prouder of them. Nay, we gather Pride, not onely out of those things, which mend and improve us (Gods blessings and mercies), but out of those actions of our own, that destroy and ruine us, we gather pride; sins overthrow us, demolish us, destroy and ruine us, and yet we are proud of our sinnes. How many men have we heard boast of their sinnes; and (as *S. Augustine* confesses of himselfe) belie themselves, and boast of more sinnes than ever they committed? Out of everything, out of nothing sin grows.[10]

And he goes on to question every phase of life, especially in its seemingly noblest parts:

O the earlinesse! O the latenesse! how early a Spring, and no Autumne! how fast a growth, and no declination, of this branch of this sin Pride, against which, this first word of ours, *Sequere, Follow,* come after, is opposed! this love of place, and precedency, it rocks us in our Cradles, it lies down with us in our graves. There are diseases proper to certaine things, Rots to sheepe, Murrain to cattell. There are diseases proper to certaine places, as the Sweat was to us. There are diseases proper to certaine times, as the plague is in divers parts of the Eastern Countryes, where they know assuredly, when it will begin and end. But for this infectious disease of precedency, and love of place, it is run over all places, as well Cloysters as Courts, And over all men, as well spirituall as temporall, And over all times, as well the Apostles as ours.[11]

Now we have no mention of Adam though thoughts of Adam's transgression must have been close to Donne as he recorded these notes. Since reference to Adam's sin is a hard use for our time, we find the argument from the omnipresence of pride, recrudescent in each phase of existence, more convincing. Such argument corresponds generally to what St. Paul was doing when in Romans he considers the pride of impiety as the root of all man-to-man wrong doings. This precisely is the point of those articles from the chief confessional documents of the English and German Reformations which we noted earlier. Donne stands in this tradition. As an expositor of the tradition, Donne's presentation of sin's origin and nature may not be wholly satisfying to whose within or without the faith. There is suggestion in what Donne

10 *Sermons,* II, 295. Cf. this comment on self-love, contained in a Lenten sermon: "Selfe-love cannot be called a distinct sin, but the roote of all sins. . . . To love our selves, to be satisfied in our selves, to finde an omni-sufficiency in our selves, is an intrusion, an usurpation upon God. . . ." *Sermons,* IV, 330.

11 *Sermons,* II, 296.

says on more than one occasion, that sin is a bath of mystery.[12] How it arose may be unknown to pure reason but is declared by the affirmations of faith and underwritten by experience.

The Forms of Sin

In the Lincoln's Inn sermon already discussed, Donne considers sin as a defeat both of the aspirations of man and of his ease in Zion. David is the chief character in the sermon since he spoke the text. Donne argues for David's defeat and deprivation at the hands of God. God chastened David, and in time David murmured against God. Even so, man's impatience in affliction may and often does result in the defeat of all patience which Donne calls the "murmuring," ". . . a leaven so kneaded into the nature of man, so innate a tartar, so inherent a sting, so inseparable a venim in man, as that the holyest of men have scarce avoided it in all degrees thereof."[13] From biblical example we are given illustration to prove that the great prophets, Job, Moses, Elias, Jonah, Jeremiah, met with stubborn refusal against their prophecy and, as a consequence, prayed God to reduce them to nothing. Such desire and prayer for reduction implies "a naturall infirmity, which the strongest men, being but men, cannot devest, that if their purposes prosper not, they are weary of their industry, weary of their lifes. . . ."[14] They see the defeat which sin calls out by agency of others, and so, sinning themselves, want the defeat both of themselves and of God's purpose. "But this is *Summa ingratitudo in Deum, malle non esse, quam miserum esse:* There cannot be a greater unthankfulnesse to God then to desire to be *Nothing* at all, rather then to be that, that God would have thee to be; To desire to be out of the world, rather then to glorifie him, by thy patience in it."[15] To do an act of restoration for one who desires "Nothing," God must further reduce that person to the point at which return becomes imperative. This happened with David after his in-

12 Donne could have said of sin, as he said of the doctrine of the Trinity: ". . . no time is too early for our faith, The simplest may beleeve it; and all time is too early for our reason, The wisest cannot understand it." *Sermons,* VI, 142.

13 *Sermons,* II, 51-52.

14 *Sermons,* II, 53.

15 *Sermons,* II, 53.

numerable sins bore their stamp upon Bathsheba, Absalom, and his whole company. But David is the type of everyman.

And therefore, change the person, and wee shall finde a whole quiver of arrows. Extend this *Man,* to all *Mankind;* carry *Davids* History up to *Adams* History, and consider us in that state, which wee inherit from *him,* and we shall see arrows fly about our ears, *A Deo prosequente,* the anger of God hanging over our heads, in a cloud of arrows; and *a conscientia remordente,* our own consciences shooting *poisoned arrows* of desperation into our souls; and *ab Homine Contemnente,* Men multiplying arrows of *Detraction,* and *Calumny,* and *Contumely* upon our good name, and estimation. Briefly, in that wound, as wee were all shot in *Adam,* we bled out *Impassibilitatem,* and we sucked in *Impossibilitatem;* There we lost our *Immortality,* our *Impassibility,* our assurance of Paradise, and then we lost *Possibilitatem boni,* says St. *Augustine:* all possibility of recovering any of this by our selves.[16]

Donne considers another aspect to the matter of sin as defeat when, in the same sermon, he decides that God makes sin serve him and his purpose. Though not at all the author of sin, God may use sin as means of humiliation or annihilation precisely because sin, as any other power or phenomenon is in partial subjection to the divine will and under total subjection to the order of creation.

Yea, let this arrow be considered as a *tentation,* yet *his* hand is upon it; at least God *sees* the shooting of it, and yet *lets* it flie. Either hee *tries* us by these arrows, what proof we are; Or he *punishes* us by those arrows of new sins, for our former sins; and so, when he hath lost one arrow, he shoots another. He shoots a *sermon,* and that arrow is lost; He shoots a *sicknesse,* and that arrow is lost; He shoots a *sin;* not that *he* is *author* of any sin, as *sin;* but as *sin is a punishment* of sin, he *concurs* with it. And so he shoots arrow after arrow, permits sin after sin, that at last some sin, that draws affliction with it, might bring us to understanding. . . .[17]

More fundamental, however, to the discussion of sin as defeat is Donne's teaching that sin reveals itself in the destruction of man's unity. Under the weight of Adam's transgression the wholeness of man is fractured, and the great divorce occurs. The exposition of this occurs in the sermon preached for the funeral of Sir William Cokayne, December 12, 1626. "God made the first Marriage, and man made the

16 *Sermons,* II, 55.
17 *Sermons,* II, 67.

first Divorce; God married the Body and Soule in the Creation, and man divorced the Body and Soule by death through sinne, in his fall."[18] The sermon is a demonstration that the only healing of the divorce, the only rejoining of the separation, comes through the cross and resurrection of our Lord.

The divorce arises from the sin of origin and is intensified by man's guilt over the multiplication of the forms of sin. The divorce is so powerfully catholic that it includes all, even newly born children. (Again, an anti-Pelagian stand.) The Resurrection which is stronger power still must include by Baptism those who have not yet felt the strain of actual sin.

As farre as man is immortall, man is a married man still, still in possession of a soule, and a body too; And man is forever immortal in both; Immortall in his soule by Preservation, and immortall in his body by Reparation in the Resurrection. For though they separated *a Thoro & Mensa,* from Bed and Board, they are not divorced; though the soule be at the *Table of the Lambe,* in Glory, and the body but at the table of *the Serpent, in dust.* . . . They that are not yet faln by any actuall sinne (children newly baptized) are risen already in him; And they that are not dead yet, nay, not alive yet, not yet borne, have a Resurrection in him, who was not only the Lambe *slaine* from the beginning, but from before all beginnings was *risen* too; and all that shall ever have part in the second Resurrection, are risen with him from that time.[19]

The divorce becomes more acute with age (if it is possible for a separation to become more of a separation as time passes); at least the symptoms seem to rage more strongly by virtue (or its lack!) of the increase of actual sin. Donne points to this fact in his last sermon preached at Whitehall, February 25, 1630:

Our *youth* is *worse* than our *infancy,* and our *age worse* than our *youth.* Our youth is hungry and thirsty, after those sinnes, which our infancy knew not; And our age is sory and angry, that it cannot pursue those sinnes which our youth did; and besides, all the way, so many deaths, that is, so many dead calamities accom-

18 *Sermons,* VII, 257. Cf. also: ". . . We have lost our possession, and our possibility of recovering, by *Adams* sin. *Adam* at his best had but a possibility of standing; we are fallen from that, and from all possibility of rising by any power derived from him: We have not only by this fall broke our armes, or our legs, but our necks; not our selves, not any other man can raise us. . . ." *Sermons,* VI, 116. Vide VII, 103-105.

19 *Sermons,* VII, 257-258.

pany every condition, and every period of this life, as that death it selfe would bee an ease to them that suffer them. . . .[20]

Two significant forms of sin, less dramatic than the popularly conceived immoral ones, are preached about in the Cokayne sermon. The text is from John 11:21, "Lord, If Thou Hadst Been Here, My Brother Had Not Died." Here the preacher begins with the doctrine of the divorce which we have just examined. He moves on to show that Martha, from whom came the text, was "directed by Faith, and yet transported by Passion" and addressed our Lord "with this imperfect piece of Devotion, which hath a tincture of Faith, but is deeper dyed in Passion, *Lord, if Thou hadst been here, my brother had not dyed.*"[21] Donne concludes that had even so sweet a soul as Martha not been divided by the original divorce, her faith in our Lord's divinity had been perfect. But having fallen heir to the trespass of Adam, she commits the sin of imperfect faith. (This conclusion of Donne's, we might say, exhibits a nasty wrenching of justice according to the non-evangelical Pelagians, but corresponds to the Reformation's non-moral interpretation of sin.)

Donne discusses the imperfection in terms of faith and prayer. Martha's words indicate her radical misunderstanding both of God's purpose for Lazarus and of Christ's theanthropic nature. In the first instance she would place her purpose before that of the Creator; in Isaiah's sense, her low ways before his high ones. Man commonly takes this point of view in his dealings with God. So in prayer generally; we cannot without equivocation really believe God's Word and practice the fruits of the Resurrection.

As long as we are in this valley of tentations, there is nothing, no not in spiritual things, not in faith it selfe, perfect. It is not *In credendis,* in our embracing the object of faith; we doe not that perfectly; it is not *In petendis,* in our directing our prayers faithfully neither; we doe not that; our faith is not perfect, nor our hope is not perfect; for, so argues the Apostle, *Ye aske, and receive not, because ye aske amisse;* you cannot hope constantly, because you doe not pray aright: And to make a Prayer a right Prayer, there go so many essentiall circumstances, as that the best man may justly suspect his best Prayer: for, since Prayer must bee of

20 *The Sermons of John Donne,* ed. Theodore Gill (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1958), p. 267.

21 *Sermons,* VII, 259.

faith, Prayer can be but so perfect, as the faith is perfect; and the imperfections of the best faith we have seene.[22]

Donne continues that "Christ hath given us but a short Prayer; and yet we are weary of that." The history of the church testifies to that weariness in the example of heretics of the primitive church and of some later schismatics who "annihilated, evacuated that Prayer" by their deletion of the petition, "Forgive us our trespasses."

But when we consider with a religious seriousnesse the manifold weaknesses of the strongest devotions in time of Prayer, it is a sad consideration. I throw my selfe downe in my Chamber, and I call in, and invite God, and his Angels thither, and when they are there, I neglect God and his Angels, for the noise of a Flie, for the ratling of a Coach, for the whining of a doore; I talke on, in the same posture of praying; Eyes lifted up; knees bowed downe; as though I prayred to God; and, if God, or his Angels should aske me, when I last thought of God in that prayer, I cannot tell: Sometimes I finde that I had forgot what I was about, but when I began to forget it, I cannot tell. A memory of yesterdays pleasures, a feare of to morrows dangers, a straw under my knee, a noise in mine eare, a light in mine eye, an any thing, a nothing, a fancy, a Chimera in my braine, troubles me in my prayer. So certainely is there nothing, nothing in spirituall things, perfect in this world.[23]

Yet Donne would be loathe to say that every good is a clear sin:

That were to say, That every deformed or disordered man were a beast, or that every corrupt meat were poyson; It is not utterly so; not so altogether; But it is so much towards it, as that there is no worke of ours so good, as that wee can looke for thanks at Gods hand for that worke; no worke, that hath not so much ill mingled with it, as that wee need not cry God mercy for that worke.[24]

There is so much corruption in the getting and vain-glory in the bestowing that nothing can be elevated to the position of an unmixed good work. On the contrary, the world may call an act a man does a good work, but the man who does the act must acknowledge its peculiarity of weaknesses and impurities.

Since peculiarity is had by Mary and Martha, Donne proceeds to

22 *Sermons,* VII, 263, 264.
23 *Sermons,* VII, 264, 265.
24 *Sermons,* VII, 265.

demonstrate how the "weakenesse appeares in the Action, and in the Words of *Martha*" in the text. The sin of origin expresses itself in these holy sisters, especially in their consideration of who our Lord was. Had Martha given second thought on the matter, she might not even have said what she did to a physician. Yet because she, and Mary, thought Christ to be but the most excellent of all physicians, and because they exercised their passion above their faith, we have the words of the text: "Lord, If Thou hadst been here, my brother had not dyed."

They thought Christ to be the best amongst good men; but yet they were not come to the knowledge that he was God. *Martha* saies, I *know, that even now, whatsoever thou askest of God, God will give it thee;* but she does not know him to be God himselfe. I doe not here institute a confutation, but here, and everywhere I lament the growth, and insinuation of that pestilent Heresie of Socinianisme; That Christ was a holy, a thrice-holy man, an unreproachable, an irreprehensible, an admirable, an incomparable man; A man, to whom, he that should equall any other man, were worse then a Devill; A man worthy to bee called God, in a farre higher sense then any Magistrate, any King, any Prophet; But yet hee was no God, say they, no Son of God; A Redeemer, by way of good example; but no Redeemer, by way of equivalent satisfaction, say those Heretiques. S. Paul sayes, *He is an Atheist, that is without Christ;* And he is as much as Atheist still, that pretends to receive Christ, and not as God. . . . Hee that confesses not all Christ, confesses no Christ. *Horribile dictu, dicam tamen,* sayes S. Augustine, in another case; There belongs a holy trembling to the saying of it, yet I must say it, *If Christ were not God, hee was a devill that durst say he was God.* This then was one weaknesse in these Sisters faith, that it carried them not up to the consideration of Christ as God. . . .[25]

And in being so ignorant of Christ's nature, they relied upon his corporeal and personal presence only; they mistook his mission and promised to themselves assurances which he had never uttered.

Donne investigates another possible form of sin in an Easter sermon preached at St. Paul's in 1625. We have already seen that Donne has concluded that sin is not "of the body." Therefore the body must be regarded highly, for the Trinity, in consultation, said, "Let us make man."

They therefore oppose God in his purpose of dignifying the body of man, first, who violate, and mangle this body, which is the Organ in which God breathes;

25 *Sermons,* VII, 266, 267. Cf. Donne's statement that Christ's work "consists not only in having preached to us, and instructed us, nor in having sacrificed himselfe, thereby to be an example to us, to walk those wayes after him; but he is Lord, he purchased a Dominion, he bought us with his Blood, He is Lord. . . ." *Sermons,* VI, 116.

And they also which pollute and defile this body, in which Christ Jesus is apparelled; and they likewise who prophane this body, which the Holy Ghost, as the high Priest, inhabites, and consecrates.[26]

A form of sin arises in the first instance when men torture the body; in the second instance when men practice fornication; in the third, when men neglect to show respect for and to perform the required duties for the dead bodies of God's saints. A major part of the sermon gives a provocative examination of these aspects of sin.

Donne recognized, of course, those varied forms of sin of which Christians and moral teachers have been ever aware. I shall not consider them since, if my appraisal of Donne is correct, he does not think of them as determinative but rather as derivative from the root of it all. Donne seems to follow that tradition which I mentioned earlier, the evangelical understanding of sin's origin and exposure. Again, we may find it helpful to remember that St. Paul seems always to hold *asebeia*, proud insolence against God, as being primary, and *adikia*, unrighteousness in the moral sense, as secondary. The intention of the letter to the Romans is to show first the disobedience. The pattern of Donne's doctrine of sin has marked similarities to that of St. Paul.

The Sin Which Lingers and Its Sole Cure

Fundamental to the Reformation doctrines of sin, and especially those coming out of Germany, was the belief that sin (as we have defined it here) continues with hard intensity in the elect. In point of fact, the contradiction which is sin operates quite as viciously in the redeemed as in those apparently outside the grace-event. (At the same time, of course, the redeemed know a Saviour.) Though influenced by the Augsburg Confession, the Thirty-nine Articles are more given to ambiguity in their stand on the condemnation of radical sin in Christian life.[27] Article XVI admits of sin following Baptism which is, of course, pardonable under repentance and confession. Article IX states: "The flesh lusteth always contrary to the Spirit; and there-

26 *Sermons*, VI, 266. In a protest against the rising Puritanism of the Carolingian age, Donne defended the place of pleasure in life; he maintained that "Christ justified Feasting, festival, and chearful conversation," but not the abuse of such enjoyments. *Sermons*, VII, 51.

27 Itrat Husain, *The Dogmatic and Mystical Theology of John Donne* (London: S.P. C. K., 1938), pp. 95, 96.

fore in every person born into this world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation. And this infection of nature doth remain, yea in them that are regenerated. . . . And although there is no condemnation for them that believe and are baptized; yet the Apostle doth confess, that concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin."

In the Lincoln's Inn sermon, previously mentioned, in which Donne considers those arrows which stick fast in us, he supports the doctrine *simul iustus et peccator:*

In our *alms,* there are *trumpets* blowne, theres an arrow of *vaineglory;* In our *fastings,* there are *disfigurings,* there's an arrow of *Hypocrisie;* In our *purity,* there is contempt of others, there's an arrow of *pride;* In our *coming* to Church, there is *custome* and *formality;* In *hearing Sermons,* ther is *affection* to the parts of the Preacher. In our sinfull actions these arrows abound; In our best actions they lie hid; And as thy soul is in every part of thy body; so these arrows are in every part of thy body; so these arrows are in every part of thee, body, and soul; they stick, and stick fast, in thee, in all thee.[28]

The similarities between this passage and that on Mary and Martha in the last section are readily apparent.

In a St. Clement Danes sermon, preached at the Order for Marriage on May 30, 1621, we hear echoes, more dramatic perhaps but no less shocking, of Rom. 6-7. After exploring the inner contradictions of his regenerate life, St. Paul cries: "Who will deliver me from this body of death? Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord. . . ." And this from Donne, who says that the Resurrection

is a mariage in that great and glorious Congregation, where all my sins shall be laid open to the eys of all the world, where all the blessed Virgins shall see all my uncleannesse, and all the Martyrs see all my tergiversations, and all the Confessors see all my double dealings in Gods cause; where *Abraham* shall see my faithlesnesse in Gods promises; and *Job* my impatience in Gods corrections; and *Lazarus* my hardnesse of heart in distributing Gods blessings to the poore; and those Virgins, and Martyrs, and Confessors, and *Abraham,* and *Job,* and *Lazarus,* and all that Congregation, shall look upon the Lamb and upon me, and upon one another, as though they would all forbid those banes, and say to one another, Will this Lamb have anything to doe with this soule? and yet there and then this Lamb shall mary me, and mary me *In aeternum,* for ever, which is our last circumstance.[29]

28 *Sermons,* II, 66.
29 *Sermons,* III, 253, 254.

Here we have the despair of one's merits by a chief amongst saints, the lowest among saints: the relinquishment of one's own satisfactions, the cancellation of one's seeming goodness, a lamentation over the residuum of the sin of origin; but always, too, the joy of being married to the Lamb, of being covered by the work of the Cross.

In the funeral sermon for Sir William Cokayne, Donne speaks at some length on the imperfections remaining in the elect. We have heard his observations on the "sweet-soul'd" sisters of Lazarus. Even though God gives to some men abounding measures of grace in comparison to the emptiness chosen by other men, or to their own emptiness before they embraced the Gospel, still those men have no boast.

> No man hath such a measure of faith, as that he needs no more, or that he may not lose at least some of that. When Christ speakes so doubtfully, *When the Son of man commeth, shall he finde faith upon earth?* Any faith in any man? If the Holy Ghost be come into this presence, into this Congregation, does he find faith in any? A perfect faith he does not.
>
> Deceive not your selves then, with that new charme and flattery of the soule, That if once you can say to your selves you have faith, you need no more, or that you shall alwaies keepe that alive; The Apostle sayes, *All boasting,* that is, all confidence, *is excluded. . . .*[80]

Finally, in the sermon preached at Whitehall on February 29, 1627, taking up in a vision the fulfillment of the eternal glory which God had prepared for his creation, Donne brings out the utter lack of resource the Christian man will have, by his own merits, at the moment of death.

> Him that dyes today, God shall not only aske, where is that Soule? Is it as cleane as I made it at first? No stayn of Sin? or is it as clean as I wash'd it in Baptisme? No sting? No venome of original sinne in it? Or is it as clean as I left it when wee met last at the Sacrament: No guiltinesse of actuall sinne in it? God shall not only aske this, Where is that Soul? Nor only aske where is that Body? Is it come back in that Virginal integrity in which I made it? Or is it no farther departed from that then Marriage, which I made for it, hath made it? Are those *Maritales ineptiae* (that we may put *Luther's* words into God's mouth) the worst that is faln upon that body?[81]

Quite obviously no Christian saint will venture an answer but will

30 *Sermons,* VII, 262. Cf. III, 128.
31 *Sermons,* VIII, 182.

stand struck before the holiness of the eternal Lord. Obviously Donne is saying only that same God himself, through his Son, will cover the bad situation and give the right answer. After all, "He that was God *The Lord,* became *Christ,* a man, and he that was *Christ,* became *Iesus,* no man, a dead man, to save man: To save man, all wayes, in all his parts, And to save all men, in all parts of the world: To save his soule from hell. . . ."[32]

32 *Sermons,* III, 302.

Parables as Literary Forms in the New Testament

By Terence Y. Mullins

In a discussion of New Testament parables it is fairly customary to begin with at least a perfunctory gesture in the direction of philology. Since I intend not to do this, I feel that a slight explanation of my reasons ought to be stated at the outset. Even the most cursive treatment of *mashal* and *parabole* inevitably gives rise to a string of paradoxes which would in this case detour the discussion from its intended issue into matters which are at best merely tangential. The Old Testament and New Testament words simply do not mean what the English word "parable" means and their uses do not dovetail with the uses of the English word. This is not a matter of discredit either to the ancient or to the modern usage. The words *mashal* and *parabole,* and also related biblical words, ought to be studied *in se* and *quoad se* and should not be apologized for when they fail to conform to current English idiom. The converse of this applies, too. The word "parable" ought to be understood as a word we use to delineate a species of literary composition without its being prejudiced by its ancestry. We do in fact know what we mean when we speak of a parable and we do not need even the slightest Greek or Hebrew to understand what a parable is.

In this paper, accordingly, I shall understand a parable to be a literary form which is generally recognized by what it does; I shall be considering the parable in functional terms. On this basis the following definition of a parable will be accepted: *a parable is a narrative account which uses possible human events as the vehicle for general religious truth.* The phrase "narrative account" is the operative phrase in the definition and is intended to be understood as indicating function here rather than type, for there are in the New Testament many types of parables and not all of them are cast in the conventional narrative mold; that is to say, not all of them employ direct narration. However, the less popular method called indirect narration still fulfills the function of narrating.

This provides the real point of departure for my study of the parables as New Testament literary forms. There are at least two levels of analysis to be considered when dealing with New Testament parables, the functional level and the grammatical level. The primary level is that of function, and it answers the question, "Is this a parable?" The secondary level is that of grammar, and it answers the question, "How is the parable presented?" To confuse the two levels of analysis in discussing New Testament parables is to admit a legion of potentially confusing, even potentially contradictory, equivocal concepts into discussion. We cannot therefore arbitrarily say, "This is not a parable because it is a question, and questions cannot be parables." Such false pedantry precludes a clear comprehension of the material. Without detracting from the significance of either level of analysis we may properly insist on their separation.

Not always, but for the most part, the functional, essential nature of the parable is easily recognized. This fact has led to a neglect of the secondary level of analysis, the matter of grammatical form by which the parable is conveyed. Yet there is much which is interesting here, and some important light can be shed upon primitive Christianity by examining it.

We know primitive Christianity almost exclusively through the writings of the New Testament. The epistles of Paul are currently conceded to be the earliest of these writings; the Gospels and the Epistle of James are all usually dated later than Paul's letters. To an utterly naive student this might seem to suggest that the parables were introduced into Christian literature after the missionary zeal of the church had spent its initial force and people had time to sit down and develop ethical and moral literature. But I know of no scholar—even among the most extreme advocates of *Formgeschichte*—who seriously contends for such a theory. There are those who question the extent to which the parables in their present structure can be attributed to Jesus, but that parables were used by him and that the parables we have owe much to him is not now moot. And yet if this is the case, then the parables themselves may, and the use of parables must, antedate the diasporac missionary activity of the church. Even as we have them today the parables represent very early Christian material, and perhaps our earliest.

This leads to other important considerations about primitive Christianity. By now critics have accepted the fact that the Christian movement grew up in a Greek world and addressed itself to Hellenic ways and thoughts. There is, nevertheless, a danger in so orienting our thoughts, for we run the risk of losing sight of the far more fundamental fact that Christianity was and is theologically Jewish. This conditioned the possible procedures open to the primitive church. It began as a movement within Judaism and spread as a movement within Judaism. Its earliest education was Jewish. The nexus between its ideas is Jewish, the understanding that truth is relative not to man but to God. This fact conditions every Christian comprehension of the world, of morality and ethics, of social relationships, and of psychological value-determination. When we examine the religious teachings of the New Testament, therefore, we shall understand all of them—including the parables—far better if we consider them as a continuation of Jewish thought than when we consider them simply as products of the Hellenic civilization.

This is pointed up with special emphasis by the parables. The favored form of religious illustration in Hellenism was the myth,[1] with the fable also popular. The favored form in the Jewish writings is the parable, used by prophet and by sage, used to convey every type of truth from practical advice to an understanding of the nature of God. Of these three forms, the New Testament abounds in the latter while neglecting both of the former. This neglect of myth and fable and the emphasis on parable indicate not merely the influence of Jewish literary form, but also of Jewish theological insight in the New Testament; for both myth and fable permit man to appear as an independent entity, while the parable stresses the relativity of man to God. Thus the myth exalts the vice or folly it attacks and makes it a monster threatening man. The fable ridicules the vice or folly it attacks and makes it a jester which embarrasses man. But the parable treats the vice or folly as a part of the nature of man himself. The parable cannot make man either a tragic hero or a fool. It cannot depict him as absolute in any

1 With the terms "myth" and "fable," as with the term "parable," I have avoided purely technical definitions which give the words unusual denotations. I am not using the words in the special and restrictively defined sense which Tillich employs, nor that of Bultmann, etc. I use the terms as descriptions of recognizable literary types.

sense. It shows him as a creature in flux and emphasizes that salvation is impossible unless creaturehood is admitted.

In its preference for the parable over myth and fable the Jewish insight proved itself greater than the Greek. A mind which can see eternal truth in commonplace activity is incomparably greater than one which can see it only in exaggeration. Both myth and fable are exaggerations of perceived behavior; they are burlesques, caricatures. They are therefore efforts to flee from reality. This brings out a characteristic difference between the use of parables and the use of fables and myths. Fable and myth are a spectator's critique. The parable is a participant's critique. The fact that primitive Christianity rigorously held to the parable shows that it accepted the involvement-in-life which is typically Jewish.

I have elsewhere pointed out that the proverb sayings of Jesus point to a reversion to older methods of Jewish Wisdom presentation.[2] Here I would note that a slightly different feature characterizes the parables of the New Testament, including those of Jesus. They indicate a decided breaking of traditional patterns of presentation, an enlarging of the range of form and method of expression beyond that commonly used by Jewish literature. No more typically Jewish method of expression is to be found in the New Testament than the parable. When this form exhibits variations from the standard Jewish style of presentation, it represents a tendency within the most primitive area of the Christian tradition.

The variation which occurred was not any change in function. On the functional level the parable remained a literary form which used a story about possible human events to carry a general religious meaning. The variation appeared on the level of grammatical form and consisted of a broadening of the basis of techniques which were used as the vehicles of the parables. Traditionally the Jewish parable was presented in the form of direct narration. One of the finest of these is the parable of Oholah and Oholibah in Ezek. 23. The prophets readily acted out their parables, as in the case of Jeremiah and the yokes of wood and iron. The relationship between Hosea and Gomer becomes an extended parable, or series of parables. And the book of Jonah is again a series

2 See my article "Jewish Wisdom Literature in the New Testament," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, Vol. LXVIII, Part IV, 1949, pp. 335-339. There, too, I discuss the theory that the Wisdom teachings represent the earliest of Jesus' teachings.

of parables. But all of these are presented in the form of direct narration. In the New Testament, too, the direct narration of parables is frequently employed, of course, as in the parable of the Soils and the parable of the Lost Son. But other forms are successfully introduced as well, namely, the rhetorical question and the taunt, and the hortative parable.

Jesus uses the form of a rhetorical question for six of his parables —all of them Wisdom parables, a fact which suggests that these were first employed early in his ministry. The parables are those of the Friend at Midnight (Luke 11:5-8), the Unprofitable Servant (Luke 17:7-10), the Tower Builder (Luke 14:28-30), the Warring King (Luke 14:31-33), the Lost Sheep (Matt. 18:12-14//Luke 15:4-7), and the Lost Coin (Luke 15:8-10). It will be noted that Luke has all six of these rhetorical question parables, and that five of them are unique to him. Although none of these parables is in the form of direct narration, there is no real difficulty in identifying them as parables because their narrative function is obvious. Each of them tells a story—there are characters, movement, and an altered situation at the end of the episode. Typical of these is the parable of the Lost Sheep which begins interrogatively, "Which man of you, having a hundred sheep, if he lose one of them, does not leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness and go after that which is lost, until he find it?" Whether the question mark is placed here or at the end of the parable is immaterial because the question is merely a technical device for situating the parable. Having the punctuation here is undoubtedly a more comfortable solution in English, but the fact remains that the rhetorical question technique embraces the entire parable. The same applies in the case of the other five parables listed. The Epistle of James contains two more parables phrased as rhetorical questions, the parable of the Partial Brethren (James 2:2-4) and the parable of the Insincere Brethren (James 2:15-17). These, too, are Wisdom parables.

Also in the Epistle of James are two Wisdom parables which are phrased as taunts. They are the parables of the Rich Boasters (James 4:13, 14) and the Rich Oppressors (James 5:1-6). As in the case of the rhetorical question parables, so with these taunts, the function is that of narrating a story; again there are characters, movement, an altered situation at the end, and the whole expresses by analogy a

general religious truth. On the functional level these are parables. The grammatical form in which the parable is expressed here is the taunt. The first taunt is addressed to the Rich Boasters and pictures them bragging about their great commercial plans only to discover that such plans are as unsubstantial as life itself. The second is addressed to the Rich Oppressors and depicts them as letting unused wealth go to waste while begrudging their servants, carousing, and silencing any who denounce them; then it suggests rather than elaborates upon their position when called to account.

The final grammatical form which the indirect narration of parables took was the hortative parable. There are two of these. Again they are both Wisdom parables, and again they are both in Luke. The first is the parable of the Alert Servants (Luke 12:36-40) and the second is the parable of the Faithful Steward (Luke 12:42-48). The latter of these is extremely difficult to classify on a mere grammatical level; it could be classified as a rhetorical question parable and it could be called the parable of the Unfaithful Steward. I interpret the entire parable as an exhortation to the faithful stewards to remain wise and faithful. (In fact, the parable features three stewards of varying degrees of wickedness and with varying punishments.) The hortative parables come the closest to being direct narrations, but on the simple grammatical level they are not.

Innovation reflects the deepest character of the innovator more surely than anything else he does. The reasons for retaining old ways are many, and the strongest of them may be trivial, but the reasons for change are few and specific and powerful. For this reason even minor changes are significant for what they tell about those who made them.

In this case we have a change in the grammatical form by which a particular type of teaching was presented. It was a change which seems to have gone unnoticed by those among whom it occurred, and uncommented upon by most subsequent observers. It was, moreover, a change which has yet to give rise to a chain of development in the organism of which it was a part. While we cannot very well ask, "What did those who made these changes hope to do?" we can properly examine the actual result of the changes and conclude that this was among the desired ends since the method was re-employed.

One obvious result of the use of indirect narration is the clarifi-

cation of the hypothetical nature of the incident and the assurance that the entire emphasis will be upon the religious issue. I have talked with people whom I knew to be intelligent who thought that Jesus was reporting an actual happening in his story of the Good Samaritan. Direct narration is always open to this sort of misinterpretation. But no one would be in danger of assuming that Jesus was describing an actual event, specific and concrete, in his parable of the Lost Sheep. The form employed circumvents that and makes it clear that this is not a particular happening but a general sort of thing which might happen any time. All of the attention, therefore, centers upon the religious truth conveyed.

The second result is that the parable is given a more immediately personal application in indirect narration than it has in direct narration. This is, naturally, most apparent in the case of those parables which were phrased as taunts, yet the same principle applies to those cast as rhetorical question parables or hortative parables. Four of the rhetorical question parables begin with the phrase "Which of you . . ." or "What man of you. . . ." The other two, "What woman . . ." and "What king . . ." are close enough to the listeners to permit partial identification of listener with the subject of the parable.

The parable, understood on the primary level of function, is a narrative account which uses possible human events as the vehicle for general religious truth. On the functional level it differs from the myth and the fable, both of which evade the real situation and criticize from a distance. The New Testament parable, analyzed on the grammatical level, uses both the traditional Jewish form of direct narration and original forms of indirect narration. The effect of the unique changes in form is to emphasize the hypothetical nature of the situation and to intensify the immediate personal application of the religious truth conveyed.

The Lutheran Scholar and Theology in America

By Gene J. Lund

NOT a few Lutherans today are proud to remember that the Lutheran Church, after a manner of speaking, was "born in a university." One result of this is that the mark of the scholar has never been far removed from most branches of the Lutheran Church. In so far as possible, high educational standards have been demanded in the training of Lutheran pastors. Many of the best known theologians in the world today are members of this church. Of all this we Lutherans have a right to be justifiably proud. It is obvious that the intellectual and academic aspects of the Christian praxis must not be permitted to atrophy. "The faith once delivered to the saints" must be held up to constant scrutiny; our theological position should be thoroughly reexamined at least in every generation. We can never afford to conclude complacently that in view of the fact that we have "Luther to our father" every question has been answered, every insight perceived. No vital, living theology can ever be labeled "completed." The work of the Lutheran scholar must go on.

I should like to consider the role of the Lutheran scholar in America. I shall limit myself to a discussion of men working in the field of theology, whether pastors, professors of theology, or others. I recognize that there are many excellent Lutheran scholars at work in other fields as well, but it will be necessary for me to limit myself in this way.

The first thing that comes to mind in reflecting upon the Lutheran scholar in America is the fact that he has worked continually in the shadow of Europe. Lutheran theology has always been dominated by European thinkers, and this still remains axiomatic today. Lutherans of America have outstripped their European brethren in some areas of Christian life (stewardship, for example), but thus far we have not caught up with them in the field of theology. Tributary to this is the fact that one of the functions of the Lutheran scholar in America has been to transmit and interpret the findings of German and Scandinavian theological thought. Reflect, for example, on all that has been written

and said here about Anders Nygren's agape and eros. Think, too, of all the space devoted in recent years to the writings of Søren Kierkegaard. The very task of translating such men has consumed a staggering amount of time and energy on this side of the Atlantic (even if not all of this work has been done by Lutherans). We recognize, of course, that most of this work has been demonstrably worthwhile. American Lutheranism would be perceptibly poorer today if this work of translating, interpreting, etc., had not been done. Much more of this remains to challenge us.

By this time, however, the Lutheran Church has been in America for more than 300 years. And by now, surely, we Lutherans in the New World ought to be ready to make our own unique contribution to the field of theological thought; after all these years we ought not be as dependent upon Europeans as we still are. Samuel S. Schmucker and the other proponents of "American Lutheranism" probably went a bit too far in making a similar recommendation in the first part of the nineteenth century. But today we should want to stand on our own feet, and not simply in order to assert our independence in this field as we have, long since, in others. The American milieu is, after all, quite different from that of, let us say, Germany or Sweden; our people (no longer of the immigrant generations) have assimilated a peculiar cultural point of view, shaped by our national history and economy; our church life is in many ways entirely different from its typical European counterpart. Originality and contemporaneousness are sorely needed in our midst. We do not wish to turn our backs on our European heritage; we simply urge that this heritage be brought up to date, and that it be made relevant to our own time and place. I think it can be argued that the Lutheran Church of America is not making the contribution that it could and should be making to our national life in these parlous times. The sober Christian realism of the Lutheran point of view could do much to purge and stabilize the American way of life if only it were more cogently articulated. And here, as always in such endeavors, we need the assistance of good minds well trained.

Some of this work, we are pleased to acknowledge, is already being done. An American Lutheran scholarly tradition is, we trust, aborning. Certain men in our midst are pointing in the right direction. But more contributors are needed; an isolated voice here and there is not

sufficient. What has prevented the shaping of such a tradition? What must be done to promote one on a broader base?

The age-old dependence upon Europe, plus the conservative perpetuation of a worthy historical process, are not alone responsible for the present status of American Lutheran scholarship. For another thing, it must be recognized that the various Lutheran bodies in our country have done very little to encourage far-ranging and independent scholarship. A few of our churches have established modest aid programs for the assistance of promising young scholars, but not enough of this, by far, has been done. Our theological schools have been maintained almost exclusively for the training of parish ministers, and once graduated from his synodical seminary the Lutheran scholar is largely on his own, not only in respect to financial support, but also in respect to the choice of a specific goal toward which to work. As a result of this rather haphazard practice, we often find that seminary chairs fall vacant without a trained successor in sight, and also that the great demands of the current expansion in our colleges finds an equal dearth of men trained to articulate the Christian point of view in the liberal arts framework. The fact that there are men available at all, with Th.D.'s and Ph.D.'s from reputable schools, is usually quite accidental and seldom the result of patient planning over the years.

The lack of a suitable Lutheran graduate school in our country is another weakness at this point. A few excellent non-Lutheran theological schools are present, of course, and many of the current crop of American Lutheran scholars have been trained in them. But the cause of Lutheran scholarship would certainly not be hampered by the presence of a top-rate Lutheran graduate school in our land. We bear in mind, naturally, that nobody could create such a school by fiat, even if he had, say, a $10,000,000 wand to wave as he wished. This is the kind of institution which must be developed through many years of testing and pruning. But would not this be a good time to begin such a project, now when there is a general ferment in the Lutheran Church in America, when new synodical alignments are coming into being? Many of our smaller seminaries will no doubt be closed, and the formation of bigger and (we hope) better schools in strategic areas will become a distinct possibility. Why should not we begin now to plan for a Lutheran graduate school of the highest order? Some dreamers have envisioned

this prospect for many years; might not this be the "fullness of time"? Occasionally it happens that Lutheran scholars who receive their training in non-Lutheran schools fail to return to serve the Lutheran Church, give up plans for ordination, etc. This does not mean that their contributions are nullified, as far as the total work of the Kingdom of God is concerned, but one could argue that their work might be even better done within the ethos in which they matured. It is painfully apparent that the Lutheran Church in America has not made the best use of the scholarly potential which it has produced.

In this same critical vein, I feel that this too can be said, that the status of the scholar in the Lutheran Church in America is not what it ought to be. "Status seeking" for meretricious reasons is one thing; the recognition of status as a concomitant of performing a necessary and important task is something quite different. In Europe the importance of scholarly work is still commonly acknowledged. Theology is no longer "the queen of the sciences" there either, but even a professor of theology in the Lutheran lands of Europe occupies a place of some prominence in the stratification of society. The "prestige" factor in this can easily be overemphasized, naturally, but I wonder if the Lutheran Church in our country has not been guilty of consistently undervaluing the role and the place of the scholar. And the ramifications of this attitude, quite apart from considerations of prestige and status, are unquestionably profound and far-reaching.

Must we demonstrate this lack of status? Documentation is not hard to come by. The very dearth of funds needed to attract men into scholarly work would seem to be, in itself, crushing evidence of this negative attitude. If a thing is not important, why jeopardize the budget on its account? But this eloquent statistical fact does not stand alone. Many potential scholars can testify to this additional fact, that Lutheran leadership in our country often appears strangely hostile to the pastor who "threatens" to continue to study (either formally or informally) in the years following ordination. This is particularly true, apparently, of the men who desire to serve as parish ministers. Scholarly competence is seldom, if ever, considered an advantage in this area. Some church officials obviously think of this as unnecessary—even, perhaps, potentially harmful. Why is this so? Are they afraid that too many other things will go undone if a man spends a couple of hours

each day in his study? The lack of scholarly status in the Lutheran Church in America can also be discerned in the lack of depth in our pulpits. The pastors of larger churches who have the means (and the nerve) to publish their sermons frequently betray the fact that popular sermonizing, with a cute story here, a simple anecdote there, plus a bit of rudimentary theologizing sandwiched in between, is the kind of pablum now demanded by the man in the pew. No eggheads need apply, unless sufficiently soft-boiled! Does the modern version of the Galesburg rule say that "Lutheran pulpits are reserved for the simplest approach possible"? Part of this can be explained, no doubt, by the rather strong anti-intellectual strain which has colored much of American Christianity throughout its history. This feeling has even permeated the church which was "born in a university." And it is no doubt true that many of our bright young men, once attracted to theology for idealistic reasons, have decided to enter other fields, where intellectuals are more readily accepted and where they consequently feel more at home.

Another unfortunate development in the Lutheran Church in America, with respect to the utilization of its scholarly resources, is seen in the fact that a number of promising teachers and writers have been withdrawn from the classroom and study in order to fill administrative positions in our church-related schools. It is important of course that these positions be filled by capable and farsighted men. But is it not possible that we are doing the cause of Christian scholarship at least a minor disservice by siphoning off talent best suited to the classroom and placing it in the office? Granted that we need scholarly, well-trained men in other positions than in teaching and that we would probably do well to follow the example of the Swedes and use some of our best-trained minds in the top executive positions in our churches. But to use this hard-to-come-by talent for fund raising, for innocuous ceremonials, for academic arbitration, and for other purely administrative functions strikes me as being questionable stewardship.

What should be done about this entire matter? Above all, we must recognize that this is a cause for concern and that something should be done about it. But where do we go from there?

First of all, the encouragement and even the overt recruitment of men of promise (as discerned particularly on the college and seminary

levels) ought to be carried on much more extensively. The provision of scholarly leadership for the Lutheran Church should not be left to mere chance. While we would not want to go so far as some, and arbitrarily select ceretain men for specific positions (we could not do this, obviously), no one could indict us for betraying our evangelical freedom if we looked ahead a bit further than we customarily have and made some general plans for the future in accordance with anticipated needs. The Holy Spirit can certainly work with and bless the efforts of those who are seeking, in a spirit of devotion and dedication, to do their best for the good of the church.

It is also high time for the Lutheran Church to awaken to the fact that the training of competent scholars is a long and costly matter, and that adequate provision ought to be made to assist men who otherwise would not be able to complete their work (at least through the doctorate). Some churches have begun to do this, and I am happy to say that the group to which I belong (the Augustana Lutheran Church) has made certain funds available for this purpose in recent years. But much more of this must be done. The grants offered for theological studies are consistently dwarfed by the stipends offered to scholars in the scientific, technological, and medical fields. This comparison may elicit some envy on our part, but more to the point, it ought to serve to remind us that our work, too, is important, and that adequate funds must be secured to finance the long years of study involved. But many individuals and foundations are unwilling, and the government (with minor exceptions) is unable to provide funds for theological studies. That places the responsibility squarely on the church; the church will have to see to it that this is done. Is this asking too much of the Lutheran Church, the church that was "born in a university"?

More generous funds are also required to attract and support the scholars needed in our Lutheran schools. Salary schedules (for all teachers in our church-related schools) are not up where they belong. It is true that one of the real blessings of learning is the fact that it often enables those who possess it to live quite satisfactorily even when financial rewards are not as great as might be expected. The bigger the mind, the smaller the need: that is frequently the case. But even so, the scholarly life is a full-time occupation, and the man at work in this field ought to be able to devote himself to his duties without at the same

time worrying about the needs of his dependents. Financial sufficiency does not, of course, guarantee first-class production; but neither does impecuniousness. Genius, it is said, can flourish in a garret; lesser degrees of inspiration need more support in order to function properly. There is no reason why the Lutheran Church in a nation such as ours cannot supply its scholars (and other servants) with the kind of support they need and deserve.

The implementation of these and similar steps would do much, I believe, to assist in the shaping of an American Lutheran scholarly tradition. Once accomplished (or at least begun), the exertion of such a tradition would enable us to apply the genius of Lutheranism to our own way of life as we never have before. That can be done; it should be done. The manpower is available. What is needed, above all, is the will and the means.

Reaction to the Arnoldshain Theses on the Lord's Supper

By Eugene M. Skibbe

ALMOST two years ago, in July, 1958, the Evangelical Church of Germany (EKD) published a study document on the Lord's Supper which has come to be known as the Arnoldshain Theses. The eight theses represent ten years of study and discussion by a specially appointed theological commission. In them leading theologians from the Lutheran, Reformed, and United Churches expressed what they believed in common concerning the teaching and practice of the Lord's Supper as based upon New Testament evidence. The EKD aspired by means of this consensus to establish a theological basis for intercommunion among Protestant churches in Germany, and therein lies the special significance of the theses for all Lutherans and the whole of Christendom.

The EKD forwarded the published theses to various church organizations throughout Germany for their consideration and opinion. Since that time the proverbial German theological debate has subjected every phase of the work to the closest possible public scrutiny. What is the meaning of each of the theses? What is their relationship to the Reformation Confessions and their relevance to contemporary confessional churches? Has EKD achieved a basis for intercommunion, or is the EKD still "on the way" to unity? Questions like these, and an amazing variety of answers to them, have been voiced in articles, monographs, and books. Peter Brunner, Helmut Gollwitzer, Paul Althaus, and Ernst Sommerlath are some of the individuals who have made significant contributions to this debate.

But the purpose of the theses was not merely to arouse theological debate among individuals. They were intended rather to challenge the churches in Germany to renewed study of the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, to decision over against the theses themselves, and finally, if

1 For a discussion and the text of these theses see The Lutheran Quarterly, XI (1959), pp. 91-111.

possible, to agreement on the doctrine of the Lord's Supper and intercommunion.

The United Evangelical Lutheran Church in Germany (VELKD) responded both prudently and positively to this challenge. Concurrent with the EKD discussion, VELKD pursued a similar, independent study of the Lord's Supper. This was published in 1957 under the title *Koinonia.* Now, in response to the Arnoldshain Theses themselves, VELKD has published its official evaluation of the meaning and relevance of the theses for the church. The Official Statement (*Stellungnahme*) was prepared by a special theological committee and presented to the Bishops' Conference of VELKD on December 4, 1959. It was published in the *Informationsdienst* and in the Jan. 15, 1960, number of *Evangelish-Lutherische Kirchenzeitung,* from which the following translation has been made.

The statement speaks for itself. It is only fitting to point out, however, the place that this statement has at the present time within the dynamics of Lutheran theology. The statement commends the EKD commission for not having perpetuated a repristination of terminology and perspectives. On the other hand, criticism is leveled at ambiguous formulations in the theses. This criticism is illustrated in Parts II and III.

The Official Statement of the Theological Committee of the United Evangelical Lutheran Church of Germany Concerning the Arnoldshain Theses

I

The Arnoldshain Theses on the Lord's Supper have been forwarded for study and evaluation to all member churches of the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) as well as to the member churches of the United Evangelical Lutheran Church of Germany (VELKD) in order to promote the necessary theological consideration of the Lord's Supper and a better understanding among the Reformation communions in Germany.

This study document, issued by a committee of theologians convened by the EKD, is in many respects a helpful statement in the present ecclesiastical and theological situation in Germany. It proposes to bring closer together the various German Protestant churches whose confessional boundaries have often been ignored in the course of the recent migrations of people in Germany. It can be a help toward overcoming uncertainty and obscurity in the preaching and in the practice

of the Lord's Supper, and by this means toward removing obstacles which thwart a growing desire in congregations for the Supper of the Lord.

It seems especially important to us that the commission has not merely resumed the doctrinal discussions of the Reformation communions, but that a place has been given to problems raised by modern biblical research which since the eighteenth century has been pursued with particular intensity and relentlessness in Germany. As was made clear in the initial stages of the discussion, modern biblical research itself cannot overcome the sixteenth century differences in doctrine; it leads instead to widely diverging exegetical results. It is all the more theologically significant that in drafting these theses the representatives of modern biblical research, together with systematicians and church historians, have taken a first step beyond their own particular historical-exegetical projects toward cooperative statements which are relevant to the life of the church. Out of this promising development in theological work, statements have ensued which bring to the fore once again important aspects of the New Testament message concerning the Lord's Supper, i.e. aspects which, because of a different perspective, had been only implied in the doctrinal formulations of the Reformation era.

The theses center upon Jesus Christ as the giver and the gift of the Lord's Supper: the risen Lord gives himself in his body and blood with bread and wine to be appropriated by all who participate in this meal. The ecclesiastical, ethical, and eschatological relevance of the meal is then made emphatically explicit; the Lord unites those who receive his body into his body, the church, and takes into his service those who are obedient to this act; thus the meal is the provision for the wandering people of God which proclaims the death of the Lord "until he comes again."

On the basis of these leading insights various doctrinal statements from Reformation times were reformulated. Waived by the representatives of the Reformed Church were the following: the parallelism of physical and spiritual eating as two separate procedures, the localization of the risen body of Christ at the right hand of God, and the gift of the meal made dependent upon the faith of the recipient. Similarly certain formulations conditioned by the perspective and presuppositions of the Reformation era were not reiterated by the Lutheran representatives. In particular they avoided trying to guarantee the real presence of the body and the blood of Christ by means of currently misunderstood terms like *res, substantia,* or *materia,* terms which have undergone a thorough change in meaning since Reformation times. In order to meet the danger of dissociating the gift of the sacrament from the person and history of Jesus, they attempted to formulate the essential content of Lutheran confessional doctrine in statements which deal with the entire action of the Lord's Supper.

II

This positive evaluation of the Arnoldshain Theses on the Lord's Supper presupposes that certain particulars in the theses be understood as follows:

1. Concerning Thesis 1.1: The Lord's Supper was instituted by Jesus Christ

on the night of the betrayal, and in the celebration of the Lord's Supper in the church he acts as the Lord who gave himself for us in death and who is risen; through this act he unfolds the meaning of his institution.

2. Concerning Thesis 2.2: The Lord's Supper is one of the "means," but at the same time a special means "by which Christ grants to us the gifts of the saving Gospel." The uniqueness consists in the fact that in the Lord's Supper Christ offers us his body and blood.

3. Concerning Thesis 3.3: "Together with prayer, praise, and thanksgiving" and through the recitation of the words of institution, bread and wine are set apart and placed in the service of Christ as he offers himself in his body and blood.

4. Concerning Thesis 4 and Thesis 5, c and d: In the Lord's Supper Jesus Christ gives himself in that he gives his body and his blood, so that those who eat and drink the bread and wine receive his body and blood by virtue of the promise of the words of institution. Corresponding to this, Thesis 5 d rejects a separation of physical and spiritual eating. This understanding of the words of institution implies that in the distribution and reception of the Lord's Supper the bread is Christ's body and the wine is Christ's blood. Yet Thesis 5 c rightly rejects the interpretation that a "material," separated as it were from Christ's person and passion, is distributed in the Lord's Supper. Such a misconception would also contradict the *"vere adsint"* in Article X of the Augsburg Confession and, corresponding to this, the Reformed *"vere et substantialiter."*

5. Concerning Thesis 4 and Thesis 8.2: To all who participate in the Lord's Supper Jesus Christ "gives . . . himself in his body given for all in death and in his blood shed for all." He "allows himself to be taken by us." That means: he gives himself to all and is received by all, even if the fruit of the Lord's Supper ("forgiveness of sins, life, and blessedness") is shared only by believers. The sin "against the holiness of this gift" (Thesis 8.2) is thus a sin against the Lord who offers himself bodily in this meal.

III

In contrast to and partly in opposition to the above understanding of specific details in the Arnoldshain Theses on the Lord's Supper, there have been other interpretations—some of them presented simultaneously with the Theses themselves —which have entered into the current discussion. They are as follows:

1. Concerning Thesis 1.1: That the formulation of the theses consciously leaves the question open whether and in what way the Lord's Supper in the congregation is related to the last meal of Jesus. The confessional statement, which speaks of the Lord's Supper as the *institutio Christi,* does not mean "an historical judgment," but refers thereby to "the surety we receive in the New Testament witness of Christ, i.e. in the church's testimony concerning the commission and promise given by the Lord, who was related to the church not only as a past historical figure but who was also the risen Lord speaking in her midst." (See H. Gollwitzer in "Zur Lehre vom Heiligen Abendmahl," 1958, p. 24.)

2. Concerning Thesis 2.2: That from the fact that the essence *(Proprium)* of the Lord's Supper involves "not the gift, but the manner given," it follows that one never inqires concerning a special gift from the Lord's Supper. Viewed in its greatest intensity the essence of the Lord's Supper can perhaps be understood as a "physical receptivity."

Consequently a distinction can no longer be made between the presence of Christ in the church's act of worship, conerning which Thesis 2 speaks ("the Lord present in the Holy Spirit through his Word"), and the special presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper, spoken of in Thesis 3 and 4.

3. Concerning Thesis 3.3: That the aversion to more precisely defining the recitation of the words of institution leads to the conclusion that the commission has agreed "not to promote a conception that this belongs, as a particular act of consecration, to an essential part of the meal." Such emphasis on setting apart the elements "approaches the idea of transubstantiation." (Gollwitzer, *op. cit.,* p. 20.)

4. Concerning Thesis 4 and Thesis 5, e and d: That the positive and negative formulations not only exclude "all misleading ideas about substance" and guard against concentration upon the elements, but also make completely inadmissible any kind of statements about the relationship of the elements to the body and blood of Christ—i.e. any statement beyond the general definition that the bread and wine are "taken up into" the total event by means of the Lord's Supper. (See W. Kreck, *op. cit.,* p. 43; also Gollwitzer, *op. cit.,* pp. 28 f.)

5. Concerning Thesis 4 and Thesis 8.2: That it is a "monstrous assertion" that the Arnoldshain Theses on the Lord's Supper can be understood in the sense of the Lutheran teaching of the *manducatio indignorum.* (W. Niesel, *Reformierte Kirchenzeitung,* 1959, I, column 13.) The intention of the Arnoldshain Theses is to deal with this entire controversy as having been superseded because *both* opposing positions "are as such inadequate." The expression "that which Christ gives to all who participate" means that which Christ gives avails for all. One can formulate the paradox thus: "Christ sends himself here to all, but only in faith can one receive him." (See Gollwitzer, *op. cit.,* p. 30; Kreck, *op. cit.,* p. 45 f.)

IV

The fact that the theses are interpreted so differently makes clarification imperative. Of course, with theses such as these a certain variation in interpretation and the possibility of differing emphasis is conceivable and even unavoidable. Yet this dare not lead to mutually exclusive, contradictory interpretations.

Obviously the theses lend countenance to such interpretations because the *language* used is suited to an elusive indefiniteness and, at times, forced interpretations. Several formulations read like a carefully balanced compromise between elements of the Lutheran and Reformed doctrines of the Lord's Supper, with the result that here the conflicts do not seem to be really solved but only covered over.

For the sake of her preaching, however, the church needs clarity of doctrine,

and for the sake of her congregations it needs simplicity of speech, especially in a matter which is laden by centuries of reflection.

Further, unmistakable in the *content* of the theses is a tendency to place the proclaimed Word in the center of attention while allowing that which is unique in the Lord's Supper to recede into the background. Preference for expressions belonging to categories of action and of the personal corresponds to an aversion for expressions in the category of being, yet such categories cannot be avoided. Of course, the particular value of the Lord's Supper lies not in the mere presence *(Dasein)* of the body and blood of Jesus Christ, but rather in the offering and the appropriation of these gifts; but within this act and *for its sake* the real presence of the offered body and shed blood of Christ must clearly be made known. Even if this presence is thought of in terms of the appropriation, nevertheless it is not only for the faith of the recipient that it avails. It must be unambiguously stated that the bread and wine given to the guest of the Lord's Supper communicate *(zueignen)* to him Christ's body and blood.

As said above, the theses require clarification. We raise the question to what extent clarification can come about through further interpretation and to what extent a new formulation must be undertaken. In our opinion, for example, the title together with Theses 1.1, 3.3, 4, and 5 require an unambiguous reformulation. Thesis 4 in particular requires greater simplicity and clarity.

V

Finally the question must be asked what value the Arnoldshain Theses can and should have for the church. As is said above in Part 1, the theses originated primarily as a study document, i.e. as theological propositions in which the signers, fully conscious of their responsibility, have presented an explanation of what can be cooperatively expressed concerning the Lord's Supper on the basis of exegetical insights and a dogmatic critique of traditional forms of doctrine.

The preface to the theses reads: "What the results of the previous work mean for the question of intercommunion and church fellowship must be given further theological consideration." It is already evident, however, that the Arnoldshain Theses are frequently understood as a theological justification for the practice of intercommunion, which is now widespread in German Protestantism, and that they are considered a church confession.

The Arnoldshain Theses on the Lord's Supper, however, are not a church confession. In order for them to become a public church confession they must first be received by and incorporated into the constitutions of the churches so that ministers can be bound to them by their ordination vow. In this we are in agreement with all persons concerned. It seems to us, however, that the theses by their very nature are not capable of becoming confessions in the sense of the Lutheran Reformation, for they avoid saying if the confessional statements previously valid for us have been replaced or complemented or how, otherwise, the relationship of old and new statements should be evaluated.

Above all, the title makes us doubt if it is at all possible by means of these theses to achieve an obligatory doctrinal statement. For a church confession is not only an assessment of what we receive today as the apostolic message, but it is at the same time a declaration of what we believe, teach, and confess within the continuity of the church.

These frank and, in some respects, critical observations concerning this careful work should not and cannot minimize the gratitude which we in the Church of the Lutheran Confession owe to the scholarship, the perseverance, and the piety of the authors. Being based upon the Bible, the theses on the Lord's Supper open up profound dimensions to Communion preaching, and in their comprehensiveness they lend to such preaching an evangelical freedom. What has been accomplished can, with further clarification, become an effective help for the church as it perennially revitalizes its doctrine and gathers around the gifts of its risen Lord.

The above statement was prepared by the Theological Committee at the request of the Bishops' Conference of the United Evangelical Lutheran Church in Germany and presented to it on December 4, 1959. The Bishops' Conference forwarded the statement to the Council of the United Evangelical Lutheran Church in Germany with the request that the clarification requested by the Theological Committee be pursued through proper channels.

Book Reviews and Notices[1]

Between God and Man, An Interpretation of Judaism. From the Writings of Abraham J. Heschel, edited by Fritz A. Rothschild. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. $5.00.

"If God were a theory, the study of theology would be the way to understand him." This quotation, which may well serve as a warning against the tendency to make Christianity a neo-gnostic system by over-intellectualizing, is characteristic of many epigrammatic statements which abound in the works of Abraham Heschel, the professor of Jewish Ethics and Mysticism at the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York. Heschel is the product of two worlds, that of Eastern European Jewry and that of Western philosophy and learning, and his work is dedicated to the attempt to produce a "viable synthesis" between the two. Since conservative Christianity is inevitably in much the same dilemma, what Heschel has to say is very often of great value, for God the Father, creator of heaven and earth, is common to both Judaism and Christianity.

It is not often that a scholar of one faith succeeds so well in communicating a view of his own religion to the outsider that is so stimulating and so penetrating. The success of this book is no doubt due in large part to the fact that the narrow apologetic, the ignorant polemic, the self-satisfied prejudice are almost entirely lacking. The editor has no doubt done an excellent task in his selection of materials for inclusion, and the book is most readable. In spite of the opening quotation, it seems clear to the present reviewer that Heschel has been very strongly influenced by Christian theologians, and the book deserves to be labeled "theology" just as much as many other books that are so designated. Theology is a bad word in Judaism, as in many university circles, and it is not necessary to use that label in order to present its content.

Part I of the work deals with "Ways to His Presence," essentially a description of the nature of the religious experience with very strong emphasis upon the sense of radical amazement, wonder, awe, mystery, which Heschel defines as "the state of maladjustment to words and notions." It is for this reason, perhaps, that theology is rejected as the way of "knowing" God, for as he says (p. 78), "However subtle and noble our concepts may be, as soon as they become descriptive, namely, definite, they confine him and force him into the triteness of our minds." Here, and in many similar statements, one can see the mystical side of Heschel, but he is not only mystic, he is just as much empirical, and it is this, to modern man, peculiar combination that seems to the reviewer so characteristic of the Old Testament, and of the New Testament as well. Theology, as a rational exercise of man's mind based upon secular philosophical systems, has too frequently resulted in the exclusion of both experience and religious awe—and precious little is left of genuine Christian content. Christian faith is identified then with acceptance of a system of intellectual propositions about God, unrelated in experience to the individual and corporate life of human beings as it actually exists. The reviewer strongly suspects that Heschel's opening remarks are highly relevant in this context: "Religion declined not because it was refuted, but because it became irrelevant, dull, oppressive, insipid. When faith is completely replaced by creed, worship by discipline ('order'), love by habit; . . . when faith becomes an heirloom rather than a living fountain; . . . its message becomes meaningless."

Part II deals with the "God of the Prophets," drawing a contrast between the biblical and the Greek pagan way of thinking. I think Heschel is correct in pointing out that for the Greek philosophers (as also for the ancient Egyptians and modern man), "order is the answer, the foundation of

1 Books reviewed or noticed in these pages may be purchased through your church's publication house.

nature," but for biblical man, order is a problem—why does it exist? Since order is of God, and the whole world of experience falls short of the glory of God, man cannot be enchanted with any existing order, for he has at least a vision of the new order. In the succeeding sections of this part, the author makes a distinction between process and event which others have also suggested. Process follows a regular pattern, continuous, steady, uniform, and typical. Events, on the other hand, happen suddenly, intermittently, occasionally. Whereas a process follows a law, events create a precedent, but events are not all of the physical order; they are of a spiritual order as well. "An event is a happening that cannot be reduced to a part of a process." Again, the direction in which the author's thought is moving is toward an insistence that God cannot be captured within the triteness of man's little mind. Heschel would have been greatly aided in this discussion by a knowledge of the religions of ancient Israel's neighbors, Egypt, Canaan, and Babylon. The reviewer feels that modern Christianity has more in common with Egypt than with Palestine in its overwhelming concern with order, political, ecclesiastical, and liturgical, and the concomitant conclusion that nothing can be good unless it fits into an existing pattern of orderly processes, inherited from the past or from the contemporary secular order. Order is a political and scientific concept, good, and of God certainly, but not realized completely in either church or state. Therefore, any further realization of the Will of God is likely to contrast to the existing processes of both; to deny this is to deify the culturally determined as binding upon God himself, and as in ancient Babylonia, God becomes simply a symbol of man's prejudices and self-centeredness, rather than a cause and a power in human life.

The following sections on "Man and His Needs" and "Religious Observance" are more specifically related to traditional Judaism, but they ought to lay to rest many typical misconceptions of Pharisaism as something concerned only with the externals of religious ritual. *Mutatis mutandis,* what Heschel says of the Jewish ritual is equally applicable to the Lutheran liturgy: "We are not always ready to rise to a level from which we could respond, for example, to the grandeur of our liturgy." Therefore, there is always a tension between regularity and spontaneity (process and event?). Like the traditional church year, "Jewish ritual may be characterized as the art of significant forms in time, as *architecture of time.*" When one contrasts to this the words of St. Paul (Gal. 4:10 f.), "You observe days, and months, and seasons, and years! I am afraid I have labored over you in vain," one cannot help wondering whether contemporary Christianity is not actually closer to Judaism than to the New Testament. One has the feeling that liturgiologists would also agree with his statement that in liturgy "the spirit of Israel [viz. the church] speaks, the self is silent."

With regard to the interpretation of Scripture, Heschel has some rather shocking things to say: "Sages here on earth have power to set aside Torah . . . their opinion may overrule an opinion held in heaven." This is said not of modern scholars, but of the ancient Rabbis, and is as a matter of fact true. The biblical literalism which many Christians attribute to the Pharisees is at best a half-truth; consequently, the authority in faith is not the text of Scripture, but in Israel's understanding of the text. But when Heschel goes on to say, "What modern scholar could vie with the intuition of such a people?" one questions whether or not he is substituting biology for the Spirit of God. This is certainly misplaced mysticism, from the point of view of either Old or New Testament.

The final Part on "The Meaning of This Hour" is eloquent and most effective. One shouts "hurrah" to read that "religion asks little of modern man. It has no courage to break idols and shatter callousness; religion has become 'religion'—institution, dogma, securities." It has achieved respectability by the grace of society and "its representatives publish as a frontispiece the *nihil obstat* signed by social scientists." Heschel is enough imbued with the spirit of prophecy to see that the most fatal trap for faith is its equation with expediency, and the wages of absolute expediency is disaster.

It is one of the few encouraging facts of

our modern situation that there are voices to give expression to the fact that religion is in a decline (though not the bulging organizations and treasuries). The complexity of modern civilization and language makes it all too easy to create a plausible rationale for importing the most cynical and hypocritical patterns of action and thought into the very heart of modern "religion." Consequently expediency (which means that which brings in statistics, human and financial) is the justification for almost any kind of action, and we seemingly do not know how to justify any value in any other terms. Aesthetics is the only value other than finance about which modern man can speak without embarrassment. In the final analysis, Heschel's book is also a good illustration of the decline of religion: he follows the popular theological line which insists that God is subject and not object. This is a good beginning, but it is a most striking fact about all theologies that, in spite of their basic principle, very rarely does God appear as the subject of a verb. In all modern man's talk about God, the verbs are missing; God becomes for us primarily the object of prepositions. Our pagan Greek heritage is still dominant, and we think to harmonize this with biblical faith by grandiose and lofty generalizations. But the biblical God is concerned with little things, even individuals, and therefore religion must be relevant to the daily run of routine. As Heschel puts it, "there will always be a spiritual underground where a few brave minds continue to fight. Yet our concern is not how to worship in the catacombs [why not include the cathedrals?] but rather how to remain human in the skyscrapers."

GEORGE E. MENDENHALL

Sex and Family in the Bible and the Middle East. By Raphael Patai. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1959.

"It is Raphael Patai's conviction that a better understanding of the Bible can be obtained if viewed against the background of nineteenth and twentieth century folk life of the Middle East. Change has been slow in the Middle East, and, Patai contends, folk life in the nineteenth and twentieth century is essentially comparable to life of the ancient Hebrews.

Biblical and Middle Eastern families are characterized by six basic traits. First, both are endogamous—showing a preference for marriage of close blood relatives. Second, both are patrilineal—descent is reckoned in the father's line and not in the mother's line. Third, both are patriarchal—the father is lord and master of his family. In the fourth place, both are patrilocal—when a man marries he brings his bride into the family and household of his father. In the fifth place, they are both extended families—consisting of the elderly male family head, his wife or wives, his sons and their wives and children, and his unmarried daughters. Lastly, they are polygamous, permitting a man to have more than one wife.

Does Patai's study of life in the Middle East throw light on biblical accounts?

To this we can give an affirmative answer. Biblical values, ethics, and attitudes often seem strange and remote to the Western reader; references are often brief, and the allusive style takes for granted knowledge of context and background on the part of the reader, leaving the modern Westerner "only a veiled glimpse of its true and full significance."

It is impossible to review the innumerable instances of similarity between Middle East and biblical Hebrew culture as related by Patai. Several examples may serve to illustrate the nature of the content of the book.

Consider the problem of sexual relations between first-degree relatives. Such relations are strongly disapproved in the West, while in biblical times and in the Middle East this was the preferred marriage type. Why was this so? Why in the patriarchal family of Abraham and his descendants were marriages between uncle and niece, nephew and aunt, and especially between cousins practiced frequently in preference to marriage with non-related women? According to Patai, such marriages were preferable because they tended to preserve property within the family, strengthened kinship ties, were more stable than marriages between non-related partners, insured greater equality of status between marriage partners, and similarity of background made it possible for them to get along better in the extended patrilocal family.

As another example of the way in which a study of the culture of the Middle East throws light on biblical accounts, Patai offers an explanation of the situation in Gen. 30 where Jacob's co-wives Leah and Rachel make an agreement regarding Jacob's sleeping arrangements on a particular night. How could women assume such freedom of decision in a strongly patriarchal family? Patai points out that two wives have equal privileges and equal rights of cohabitation with the common husband and that if the pattern was to be altered they, rather than the husband, were the ones to alter it.

But why did Rachel give up her privilege of cohabitation for mandrake plants? Here Patai refers to the belief that the mandrake plant when eaten will make barren women fertile and impotent men potent. This belief has existed in the Middle East from antiquity to the present time and is shared by many peoples in the world.

Our last example deals with the practice of the son taking possession of the wives of his deceased father. There are several such instances related in the Bible as isolated cases which are not easily understood out of context. This is true of the reference to Reuben cohabiting with his father's concubine in Gen. 35:22 and Absalom's taking of his father's wives and concubines as related in II Sam. 15:16; 16:20-22.

In the latter case, when Absalom rebelled against his father David and at one point succeeded in establishing his rule in Jerusalem, he asked the advice of Ahithophel, the wisest counselor in the kingdom. Ahithophel's advice was that he "go in unto" the ten concubines whom his father David had left behind when he fled. This Absalom did with the greatest possible publicity—thereby asserted his succession. The taking possession of the wives of a deceased father was regarded as the most important act establishing the right of a son to the inheritance of his father, according to an old Semitic custom.

The above are but a few of the numerous examples one could give to indicate that a careful reading of Patai's book does provide a useful background for understanding many of the incidents recorded in the Bible, and most especially in the Old Testament. It is to Patai's credit that only in rare instances does the relationship made between Middle Eastern culture and that of the Bible seem strained.

In the last chapter Patai suggests a second purpose of the book—beyond the enlightening of the biblical student through a study of the Middle Eastern culture. Here he suggests that our Western family pattern is flexible and malleable and in need of modification if it is to approach the good life spelled out in the American ideal. He points out that in the present time we have an over-emphasis on youth, that the family is fractured too early by the children leaving home, and that the middle-aged and elderly live an isolated and lonely life. By way of a solution he suggests that we learn from the patriarchal family of the Middle East with its emphasis on family unity, regard for the wisdom of older people, and support of persons in their old age.

Patai's criticisms of the contemporary Western family are not new, nor are his solutions new. Anyone familiar with contemporary Western society is aware of the stresses and strains and inadequacies of the family as it attempts to adjust to complexity and change. The extended patriarchal family is not a family type easily suited to an urban, mobile society. This is not to say that many of its features are not without merit. The question of adapting them to our type of society is one Patai does not tackle.

Raphael Patai is a competent researcher and author on the Middle East. He is director of research at the Theodor Herzl Institute, has acted as Middle East consultant for the United Nations Department of Social Affairs, and as director of the Syria-Lebanon-Jordan Research Project of the Human Relations Area Files, Inc.

FLOYD MARTINSON

A Light to the Nations. By Norman K. Gottwald. New York: Harper Brothers, 1959. $6.50.

The books continuously appearing on the Old Testament may generally be classified as either histories, introductions, or theologies of the Old Testament. This volume is an attempt to synthesize all three of these areas. The history of the Hebrew people, the

problems of the literary origin of the books of the Old Testament, and the development of the theological concepts as well as the cultural and social changes are integrated to indicate how Judaism and Christianity ultimately developed. The reader is first introduced to the problems of text and canon and the critical problems with brief reviews of how these problems have been dealt with. This is followed by a survey of the history of the ancient Near East as a stage for the setting of the history of Israel, thus orienting this history in relation to the people which inhabited the whole area of the Fertile Crescent. In this connection the author has included 17 small maps to illucidate the location as well as the dates of the periods in which the various peoples were particularly influential in shaping the destiny of the Hebrew people. Then follow chapters on the Fathers of Israel, the people of the covenant, the settlement of the land, the great kingdom, the kingdom disrupted, the collapse of Israel, the decline of Juda, the people in exile, the reconstruction under the Persians, and the reconstruction under the Hellenists.

The author has presented a fairly comprehensive review of the results of critical scholarship in each of the literary, historical, and theological areas of Old Testament studies, and then he indicates the view which he accepts or prefers. In all fairness to the author it should be stated that he has been careful to emphasize that views of authorship, sources, compilations, etc. are not proven facts but rather hypotheses and theories to be examined and reexamined, and that conclusions are based on what seems to be most rational to each one.

In treating the books of the Pentateuch the author adheres to the Wellhausen hypothesis, though he dates the J and E sources a century earlier than is usually done. While he recognizes that the Pentateuch was not written primarily as a history but rather as a religious record, he seems to forget this at times and judges the record from the viewpoint of modern history writing in spite of the fact that ancient history writing did not follow the principles of modern history writers. His evaluation of the Pentateuchal sources is startling indeed. He regards the Deuteronomic source as a perversion of historical fact, exceedingly biased and therefore unreliable as a historical document. "The D writers were following an intensely human trait when they read history morally and fell into the error of foreclosing the evidence" (p. 159). Over and over again he depreciates the evidences presented by this source. On the other hand, he regards the J source as the zenith of achievement in history writing in the Old Testament.

The author attempts to reconstruct the settlement of Canaan as over against the record of the book of Joshua which he regards as "an inadequate framework for conceiving the occupation of Canaan." He sees in the patriarchal stories a basis for believing that there were two groups which migrated from Mesopotamia into Canaan: an Abraham group which settled in the south and eventually became united with a Judean group of Medianite-Kenite origin; secondly, a Jacob group which settled in the north and was of Aramean origin. From this latter group a splinter party, represented probably by the Levi group, migrated to Egypt and was delivered from bondage under the leadership of Moses. Eventually all of these groups settled in Canaan. There was no conquest in the usual sense of the word, but a peaceful co-existence of Canaanites in these groups.

In his discussion on the religion of Moses he regards Moses as a henotheist. He believes that Moses was introduced to the worship of Yahweh while among the Medianites. He accepts the probability that there was a religious covenant concerning which he makes the statement: "The Hebrew apprehension of God and man was covenantal through and through," but leaves the matter without further implications. He makes very little of the covenant idea as far as Moses is concerned. Concerning the Ten Commandments, he believes that there were only eight "brief pithy statements," and these in themselves could not have governed the people.

The author regards the picture which the Old Testament gives us of the Canaanite religion as exaggerated and contends that originally the line of differences between the Hebrew and the Canaanite was not clearly drawn, except that the former was nomadic and the latter sedentary. "The superiority of Israel's faith was not something patent at the start by which she rejected the Canaanites and obliterated them."

When the author discusses the founding of the monarchy and the record of it in the books of Samuel he regards this record as unreliable and historically inaccurate. He regards Saul as a hero who has suffered ill treatment at the hands of the biblical historian in order to enhance the stature of King David. "All in all, Saul has fared unjustly at the hands of later generations." "The late source thus pictures Samuel as a pompous ecclesiastic and Saul as a stubborn blunderer. Neither of these is a true estimate of the men." David is presented as a shrewd, calculating king who had an unusual ability to attain what he wanted. He did build a great kingdom, but he used methods which cannot be condoned.

In treating the history of the divided kingdoms he attempts to put North Israel in a much more favorable light than most biblical historians, and considers it to have become more mature religiously and politically than the South. "The political and religious virility was greatest in the North in spite of the derogatory evaluation of Israel by the Deuteronomists."

The author is at his best when he makes his survey of the prophetic writings. While extremely critical of the biblical text, he has succeeded in delineating the theology of the prophets in an excellent manner, and his interpretation of each of the prophets is an excellent contribution to the understanding of their messages.

While this reviewer cannot agree with the author's conclusions, especially in matters of the biblical text and of the history of Israel, he has found the reading of this book both interesting and stimulating. He cannot recommend it to the average lay reader, but to the reader who is informed in matters of the critical problems of the biblical text and the history of the Hebrew people it is stimulating and challenging. The book is augmented with a glossary of biblical words and expression, a rather extensive bibliography, and an appendix of Near Eastern texts related to the Old Testament.

The author is a graduate of both Union Theological Seminary and Eastern Baptist Theological Seminary and has his Ph.D. from Columbia. At present he is professor of Old Testament at Andover Newton Theological Seminary and is associate editor of *Foundations: A Baptist Journal of History and Theology.*

CARL A. ANDERSON

The Book of Tobit. By Frank Zimmermann. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. 190 pages. $5.00.

This is the sixth volume to appear in the Jewish Apocryphal Literature Series. It consists of a 42-page introduction, the Sinaiticus Greek text of Tobit with translation and notes, plus seven appendices, the last appendix offering the Vaticanus Greek text. In the introductory section such subjects are dealt with as folk themes in Tobit, date and place of authorship, original language, extant versions, and the teachings of the book.

Especially noteworthy among the introductory items is Zimmermann's proposal of Antioch as the scene of the book's composition. While some of the arguments advanced in favor of Antioch are weak, especially the claim that the burying of dead Jews indicates opposition to Seleucid persecution, Zimmermann's approach does present a healthy reaction against Alexandria's traditional role "as the sole literary center outside of Palestine." The original work is placed in the latter half of the second century B.C., chapters 13 and 14 being later additions assigned on somewhat tenuous evidence to the period after A.D. 70.

Many of the notes accompanying the text and translation and also a good deal of the material in the appendices support the author's view that the work was originally composed in Aramaic and then translated into a Hebrew version which is the ancestor of our present Greek texts. The notes also provide both a brief discussion of historical and geographical matters and an explanation of many of the niceties of the book's style, such as double meanings and dramatic irony.

The only serious weakness is in the overly brief section on the teachings of the book. The ethics involved receive a fairly adequate treatment, but the theological point of view of the original author is passed over much too quickly. The highly important issue of the place of Tobit in the development of angelology is touched on in only one brief paragraph.

However, in spite of this one weakness

and the objections which may be raised to some of Zimmermann's views on individual details, this book like all the other volumes of the Jewish Apocryphal Literature Series is a necessity for every serious student of the intertestamental period.

RONALD M. HALS

History of Religions. By E. O. James. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. 237 pages. $2.75.

Every major publishing house has to have a good history of religions on its shelves. Harper has E. O. James's short presentation. It is an excellent summary, well planned and arranged, filled with accepted facts and evaluations, and presented with the authority of a scholar who has a thorough knowledge of the field. What more could one want?

With the exception of the presentation of the Judaean Christian religion I can recommend this book for the purpose for which it was written. It can well be used in classroom and in study. The accumulated lore of a century or more of study by many scholars is gathered here, ready for use.

Yet the book represents an oft repeated tragedy. Although written by a man who has become an authority and possesses the full knowledge of his field, it is imperative that the subject matter should be presented by one whose eyes are fresh and whose voice has a new ring to it. The slogans and the battle-cries of a former day, hard-fought and hard-won as they may be, have a rightful place in memoirs. They should not be allowed to stifle as vital a subject as religions. In most of the content of the book, this is little noticed. It becomes horrendous when early nineteenth century views of the ministry of Jesus and the Gospel still prevail. And it is sad when the traditional first chapter on "How Religion Began" and on "Primitive Religion" are still presented in schematic ways we should try hard to forget.

J. KNUDSEN

Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats: The American Protestant Missionary Movement in China, 1890-1952. By Paul A. Varg. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. xii + 335 pages. $6.00.

This is a documentary study of the political influence of American missionaries in China and their involvement in the shaping of U. S. foreign relations with that country up to the time of the Communist occupation. As such, it is probably the most exhaustive and detailed monograph on that aspect of Protestant missionary work ever to appear. A very impressive amount of information, previously unavailable in printed form, has been culled from the U. S. Foreign Relations Files of the Department of State, from the Missionary Research Library, from the archives of the American Board (Congregational), and from other sources. The resulting volume is surely required reading for missions specialists, foreign affairs experts, and all persons concerned with discovering the reasons for the "failure" of American policy in China.

Professor Varg is a secular historian and looks at the history of the Protestant missionary movement in China "as a problem in the relationship between two basically different cultures. The central interest is in something broader than the missionary movement: namely, the difficulties involved in the attempt to export American ideology, whether it be Christianity, democracy, or capitalism" (p. viii). In view of the author's historico-cultural presuppositions, it is not strange that he reaches a largely negative conclusion. Christianity, he argues, brought to China a body of precepts unrelated to the needs and aspirations of the Chinese people (p. 319). It failed to meet the major need of those politically conscious Chinese who sought to create a powerful nation-state. "Because the Christian Church in China met no generally recognized needs, it remained largely an esoteric enterprise without roots in the Chinese soil" (p. 320). Americans failed to grasp the revolutionary character of the social and political upheaval in China. Their motives and attitudes represented, at their best, an irrelevant expression of altruistic individualism; at their worst, an admixture of paternalism and racial superiority, argues Varg. Whether understood or misunderstood, their presence in China was of no permanent consequence.

The author writes from outside the circle of faith and, by his own admission, with no bias in regard to missions. While his facts are indisputable, his interpretation of motivation and attitudes leaves much to be desired.

To him the early missionaries were racially and culturally overbearing, were prompted by a desire to spread their own sectarian doctrines, and had a simple trust in the efficacy of the Bibles and scripture portions which they were distributing. The Boxer uprising and the growth of nationalism tempered this arrogance to some extent, making the missionaries more humble. But the missionaries whom the author admires—liberals belonging to the "Christian socialization wing" of Protestantism—addressed themselves to the social and cultural needs of China at the price of abandoning the proclamation of the Gospel and establishing an indigenous church. Programs of reconstruction, the author implies, were steps in the right direction but too limited in scale to meet the challenges of an entire nation.

The author's conception of missions therefore is the propagation of a compound of *American religion-cum-culture-cum-democracy,* not the proclamation of the Gospel of God in Jesus Christ (whether by Americans or nationals of any other country). If this indeed was the objective of missions in China, then unquestionably missions *were* a colossal failure and ought never to have been attempted. By this standard they would have to be condemned as the religious and spiritual aspect of American political and economic imperialism. Varg presents fresh documentary evidence for the charges of the Chinese Communists (and many Chinese Christians) on this point. What is most regrettable is the author's inability to distinguish the divine treasure from the earthen vessel in which it comes, the revelation of God in Jesus Christ from the empirical forms and persons and institutions which represented it. Varg's concern is exclusively with the empirical, the recordable, and the verifiable—in this case the American, Christian democratic culture in process of being transplanted or exported to China. The missionary calling and task which originates in the eternal will and purpose of the triune God for his creation, and of which man's activity is merely the response or reflex, is totally misunderstood or ignored. Perhaps it is too much to expect a secular book to be written in any other way. In the author's defense it should be stated that he *tries* to be sympathetic and understanding, avoiding hostility and condemnation. But the standpoints of the interested *outsider* and that of the committed *participant* are totally different.

Lutherans will be disappointed that the book totally ignores their area of work in the Middle Kingdom. This is true of the American Lutheran work as well as that of the Germans and Scandinavians. One has the impression that the documentary evidence is complete only so far as the more liberal American Protestant missionary groups working in the coastal areas and port cities are concerned. These are the groups whose representatives were vocal in expressing their opinions through the National Christian Council and articulate in writing letters to consular authorities, etc. Only the most marginal references are made to the influence of the great China Inland Mission, the work of the Southern Baptists, the C. & M.A., and other conservative evangelical groups working in the interior. The work of the "fundamentalists" is evaluated on the basis of the statements of their opponents in the liberal camp and dismissed in a few paragraphs. The value of the book is marred by the limited and one-sided representation of points of view. When all this has been said, however, the author's political message is one which should be heard by all persons actively engaged in the missionary enterprise.

JAMES SHEARER

The Religion of the Occident. By Martin A. Larson. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. 711 pages. $6.00.

This book purports to be a genetic study of the Christian faith from a frankly humanist and secularist point of view. What humanists have been saying all along from a more limited perspective, i.e. that the Christian faith is a product of the merging of many ancient cultures, is said here with elaborate documentation drawn largely from original sources. The religion of the Occident, the author says, is the Christian religion. But before becoming the Christian religion, it was many other religions, oriental as well as occidental. Pythagoreanism, Orphism, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Osirianism (Egyptian mystery), Essenism, and even Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism each in

its own way contributed to the "Gospel Jesus" to which the religion of the Occident fell heir. Just how all of these religions found their way to the Christian "Olympus" does not seem to constitute too great a problem for the author. Similarity of doctrine or practice seems to provide sufficient evidence of borrowing. He leans heavily on the impact of the Essenes, whose religion he sees as a complex of Greek and Egyptian mysteries, of Zoroastrianism, and of late Judaism. Jesus, he thinks, emerged from this community, and the rise of the Christian church can only be understood against the background of that community.

Even if one were to grant the remote possibility that all of these streams of culture coalesced in the formation of the Christian tradition to become the religion of the Occident, one would be hard put to identify this religion with the Christian faith as Christians themselves have understood it. Dr. Larson evidently has no appreciation for the decisive role that revelation has assumed, and is coming more and more to assume, in a proper understanding of the Christian faith. And along with this, there is no distinctive or decisive role given to Christ in that revelation. On the contrary, it is the business of this book to refute such a notion.

But in saying this, one does not need to disparage so noble an attempt as Dr. Larson's to reconstruct the cultural context in which the revelation took place, or ignore the complex patterns of thought and conduct through which this revelation found expression. At the same time, the failure to reckon with the radical newness that came with the revelation and to reduce the Christian faith to a concatenation of purely immanental cultural forces inevitably leads to an evisceration of the faith. One of the many valuable results which is emerging from the current theological renaissance is just this irreducibility of the Christian faith to cultural dimensions. (Incidentally, in a commendatory introductory statement in the book, Dr. Harry Elmer Barnes gives some interesting biographical details from his own life that led him to repudiate the distinctiveness of the Christian faith, and this may well serve to explain how Dr. Larson himself came to adopt the same point of view.)

The book is packed with information, containing 660 pages of text, plus 35 pages devoted to bibliography and index. It includes quotations and analyses of source materials not readily available even in well equipped libraries. It can serve as a valuable source for ready reference, and this alone is worth the price of the book.

STANLEY L. OLSEN

The Pressure of Our Common Calling. By W. A. Visser 't Hooft. New York: Doubleday, 1959. 91 pages. $2.50.

We live in a day of church mergers and unions. The thought and hope of unity and union extends to the hope of eventual union of the entire Christian church. One may wonder if there might be a mingling of common "woes" in the pressure.

In his recent book, *The Riddle of Roman Catholicism,* Jaroslav Pelikan pleads for a deeper understanding of the Catholic Church and its theology. Elsewhere he says that the reading of books written by Catholics reveals that "in one volume after another conventional and often trite expositions of church doctrine or devotion are suddenly punctuated by comments that disclose new and deep stirrings within the Roman Catholic Church" (*Christian Century,* Oct. 14, 1959, p. 1182). Oscar Cullman in his little volume, *A Message to Catholics and Protestants,* suggests that offerings be taken by these bodies for each other as a symbol of *"solidarity, of brotherhood among all who invoke the name of Christ."*

Books like these are broader in scope than that of Visser 't Hooft who, for the moment at least, is concerned with Protestant unity. He desires theological foundations for unity, which is not something to be forced, but is to be found when it is centered in Christ, and only then. "Ecumenical conversation cannot be conceived in terms of negotiations but only in terms of a common struggle to arrive at a common mind about the truth that is in Christ," because the "ecumenical movement is not concerned with unity in general or at any price." "It must have a common point of orientation in order to have a common sense of direction."

Unity, as a gift from God in Christ, is something to which we make response in

faith, dedication, and obedience. It will express itself in witness, service, and fellowship, all having their center in the gifts of God through his church. When our human prejudices and weaknesses are yielded to the will of God in Christ for unity, there is the possibility of unity, which is a necessary good, because there cannot be several churches any more than there can be several Saviours. In the early church unity was preserved, even though there were threats of schism.

Here is a Bible-centered discussion of a vital topic by a theologian who has not only had an extended personal part in ecumenical councils and movements, but who also has spent time studying and pondering the theological basis of unity.

The five chapters of the book are: "How Does Unity Grow?" "The Calling to Witness." "The Calling to Service." "The Calling to Fellowship in Christ." "The Calling to Unity in Christ." Brief though this book is, it takes the measure of the steps toward unity that have been achieved, and points the way toward further achievement.

This is a study book, and as such it will be thoroughly examined and analyzed. As an example of the difficulty of perfect agreement in a fellowship where there is freedom of interpretation, the author cites different viewpoints in understanding, or attempts at understanding, the Lord's Supper. But the book helps to give us a theological concept of why we do what we do as parts (members) of the church of Christ. Yet I find myself asking the question: Can unity be attained which will not bring about new divisions? What kind of church structure could achieve this goal? Can there be unity without the suppression of the freedom inherent in Protestantism? Is there any way to prevent the formation of new church bodies except through submission to ecclesiastical totalitarianism? Unity has been talked about and championed by movements that have ended only in bringing about new denominations.

The author has done an exceedingly good job, and his call for a study of the theological foundation of unity should not go unheeded.

VICTOR E. BECK

The Recovery of Purpose. By Emile Cailliet. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959. 185 pages. $3.50.

In this brief book Emile Cailliet uses examples from contemporary drama, literature, philosophy, and science to document his claim that modern man is wary of finality and purpose.

Cailliet speaks impellingly—but often more sermonically than theologically—about the need of modern man to recover the lost notion that history has a "cause" and a "purpose." The reader is inclined to agree with the author but also feels that his research, or at least his documentation, is limited. In practically no time at all Cailliet credits modern science with abandoning or discrediting the previously generally accepted idea of purpose. One could wish that he had taken the trouble to engage in discourse with such other notable writers on this subject as Karl Heim or Mascall.

When Cailliet deals with the old Aristotelian and Thomistic notion of purpose it is hard to tell whether he is "for" it or "against it". It is only much later in the book, when the writer touches upon Anselm's notion of "faith seeking understanding," that his view becomes clear.

Cailliet is at his best in this book when he writes about the right way to interpret the Bible. Here he speaks most potently about the God who acts, who acts contrary to expectation, and who acts in and through history to reveal his purposes and to redeem mankind.

The jacket says that in this book Cailliet "shows the biblical path to a new awareness of God's design." In a sense he does this, although by sketching the history of Christian doctrine rather than by elaborating a pivotal biblical motif, but in another sense he fails. Any way you look at it, the Bible gets "short shrift" in this book. There is very little treatment of the notion of the kingdom of God; and eschatology, which one would naturally expect to come in for serious consideration, gets not a nod. How can one presume to deal meaningfully with the concepts of cause, purpose, meaning, and fulfillment without discussing at least some of the significant theological writers on the

subject such as Paul Althaus, W. G. Kümmel, Rodolf Otto, C. H. Dodd, J. Weiss, and Helmut Thielecke?

One is tempted to criticize the author for certain other undeveloped or moot statements, such as that "the gospel actually begins with Noah" or "What Luther's view of redemption may be said to have missed is the truth of redemption into the kingdom of God through daily dying and rising again with Christ. . . ." Likewise, one is tempted to ask why the author found so little to substantiate the notion of theistic purpose in his own Calvinistic tradition. But that might not be fair, even if interesting.

All in all, the book is a disappointment. The attempt to do much without either limiting the field of reference or expanding the treatment of the main theme has resulted in little.

L. Dale Lund

The Gospel We Preach. Sermons on a Series of Gospels for the Church Year, Second Series. By Sixty-five Lutheran Pastors. Rock Island: Augustana Press, 1958. xv, 347 pages. $3.50.

This is a collection of sermons by sixty-five parish pastors of the Augustana Lutheran Church on the "Second Series" of Gospels for the Church Year. In a volume of this sort it is inevitable that the reader finds a variety of homiletical styles and methods. As the book's title would suggest, most of the sermons are expository in nature, although topical preaching is well represented.

In gauging the ability of any sermon to "hit its mark," to serve as a bridge over which the traffic of the Word is carried from God to man, this reviewer is conscious of Reinhold Niebuhr's stinging criticism of twentieth century Protestant preaching: ". . . the inadequacy of the sermon is roughly symbolic of the fact that the central message of the Christian religion . . . is not being made applicable for the problems of our common life." Ofttimes a glance at the sermon's language and its illustrations will show forth its ability to meet Dr. Niebuhr's requirement. One might ask whether translation into the vernacular is not as much a necessity in twentieth century Christian worship, including preaching, as it was in the sixteenth century. As to illustrative material, one could wish that greater contact had been made with the cultural situation of the reader or listener.

At the same time, the editors of this collection are to be commended for gathering together a series of sermons which are strongly Bible-centered and marked by real pastoral concern.

Francis E. Reinberger

A Genuinely Human Existence. By Stephen Neill. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1959. 312 pages. $4.50.

Anyone who has read Stephen Neill's books—and they are already quite a few—knows their author to be a most gifted man. He is quick to discern relevant issues, patient in teasing them through their manifold shapes, and all this with imagination, learning, and wit. Besides being a bishop and an Anglican representative on the staff of the World Council of Churches in Geneva, Stephen Neill is also a very good scholar. Like many scholars of the present day, he feels it important to address himself to what might be called problems of a "field-nature" rather than those of a "discipline-nature." What I mean by this distinction might be summarized in this way: a field of learning has its rules and procedures applied to it from the outside whereas a discipline creates its own rules and procedures in virtue of its subject matter. In the first instance the methods of understanding, explanation, and analysis are extrinsic; in the second instance the methods are intrinsic to the subject matter and its history. To know the subject matter is then to know the means of attack and comprehension.

Even though his topic here is human existence, Bishop Neill eschews the devices of typical psychological disciplines. His claim, not altogether unfamiliar, is that human existence is like a field, and it cannot be made into a discipline (except in the broader ethico-religious understandings of the term "discipline"). In the first chapter the author argues (a) for "knowledge which is obtained by intuitive apprehension of the individual" (p. 30), (b) that human nature has once been seen in its fullness, in Jesus of Nazareth"

(p. 36), and (c) that such an understanding of human nature "supplies principles sufficiently comprehensive to give meaning and significance to the whole range of possible observation" (p. 37). With such an orientation firmly articulated, the author then proceeds to a kind of Christian psychology in which human existence is observed, judged, explained, etc. by the help of these extrinsic but ostensibly Christian principles.

Of course there are many issues at stake in such an endeavor. Neill's program is superior to his performance by a long way, though it must be said that his performance is still a very lively and readable account. Instead of getting what might be called a "psychology," a kind of "logos" of human personality via Jesus of Nazareth, we seem to be getting a "logos" of human nature via Bishop Neill. Because he is an estimable man, full of charm and gravity, he tells us a great deal that is pertinent and interesting, albeit not so unequivocally Christian as we have been led to expect.

Bishop Neill's judgments are striking, to say the least. He tells us: "Our Western world is on the whole dominated by the intellect" (p. 86), "Jesus is at the same time the most accessible and the most withdrawn of men" (p. 55), the "general attitude of Christian faith towards sex is extremely simple and positive" (p. 173). The book begins as an argument about how an adequate psychology should be written; but the book seems to me to be sustained not by an argument and evidence but, rather, by a somewhat supple series of essays, full of intelligent comment, not all of which makes the main point any more plausible.

It seems to me that this book needs the tight reasoning and careful marshaling of both theological views and psychological facts that one can discover in *What, Then, Is Man?* (St. Louis: Concordia Press, 1958). This latter book, edited and written in large part by Professor Paul Meehl, also takes seriously the Christian witness about man, but it has the merit of juxtaposing, very specifically, theological claims and the psychologists' hypotheses. The result is that reflective problems begin to loom up quite clearly, whereas Neill's book lets problems rise in the abstract and, despite his disclaimers, his solutions stay that way too. His problems lack clarity because they are not specific. Thus his suggestions about a Christian psychology sometimes seem to include admonitions about how to behave as well as descriptions about human behavior. The elementary distinction between "is" and "ought" never gets clearly addressed.

Nonetheless, this is a most suggestive piece of writing. Though it does not resolve issues, it still has the merit of pointing them out. It needs more concreteness, more detail, and more specification of Christian doctrine and psychological facts. But one man cannot do everything, and this, after all, is still an area, a field, and not quite a discipline.

PAUL L. HOLMER

The Christian, the State, and the New Testament. By Archie Penner. Scottdale: Herald Press, 1959. 128 pages. $2.50.

God and Caesar: A Christian Approach to Social Ethics. Edited by Warren A. Quanbeck. Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1959. 207 pages. $3.95.

If the Churches Want World Peace. By Norman Hill and Doniver Lund. New York: Macmillan, 1958. 148 pages. $3.00.

The struggle between political realists and idealists has been going on throughout the course of human history. The reader leaves these books with the distinct impression that it may take even more than the threat of nuclear annihilation to make idealists out of Lutherans or realists out of Anabaptists.

Archie Penner analyzes the political ethics of the New Testament as one fully committed to the historic Anabaptist-Mennonite position. After a brief survey of the Christian's relation to the state espoused in the leading ages and theologians of church history, the author devotes four successive chapters to the teachings of Jesus, Paul, Peter, and John.

On the basis of hermeneutical principles colored strongly by sectarian presuppositions, Penner develops an absolute dualism between the realms of Christ and culture. Then the Christian ethic is developed in terms of the perfectionism of the realm of grace. In the Christian's personal implementation of the Sermon on the Mount, no distinctions are ever made between law and gospel, creation and redemption, civil righteousness and

Christian righteousness. No tensions arise because the righteous do not act sinfully and the sinful do not act righteously. Luther's ethics, taking all of these factors into dialectical consideration, is dismissed by the author (on the authority of Troeltsch and Sabine) as pragmatic dualism.

The exegetical conclusions are summarized in a final chapter. The state is a sinful necessity. It can never be Christian outside the order of grace. It is God's arrangement for police action and even warfare. Furthermore, every *de facto* state is a *bona fide* state to which all Christians must be subject. And "since the New Testament knows of only one ethic," *agape* demands absolute nonresistance from every Christian. "This means, specifically, that the Christian cannot participate in any function which is directly connected with the retributive action of the state." This will insure the Christian from being polluted and provide the world with a perfect example of love.

The symposium edited by Quanbeck is of a very different realistic spirit and consists of nine of the essays presented to the Lutheran social ethics seminar at Valparaiso University over the past decade. While the foreword rightly emphasizes "the preliminary nature of the findings," this volume should make some valuable contributions to our understanding of Christian political ethics.

Otto Piper contributes three fine essays on the biblical-theological foundations of Lutheran social piety. "Justification and Social Ethics" develops the centrality of God's saving love as the fountainhead from which all Christian faith and love flows. "Faith and Daily Life" stresses the primacy of the Word of God as characteristic of the evangelical approach to the good life. "The Church and Political Form" is an especially lucid formulation of the differences between Lutheran, Calvinist, and Roman Catholic interpretations of the relation of Christ and culture.

George Forell continues his pioneering work in Lutheran social ethics in "The State as Order of Creation." Citing the state as "the most crucial problem of the 20th century," Forell employs the theology of Paul and Luther to judge and condemn those German Lutheran theologians who surrendered the faith by baptizing the Nazi state as an autonomous law unto itself. For the American reader, this may well prove to be the most enlightening chapter of the book.

Jaroslav Pelikan makes a penetrating study of "Totalitarianism and Democracy" and finds more affinities between Christianity and democracy than most conservative theologians have conceded (though less than most liberals boast of). Arthur Piepkorn analyzes "Church, Nation, and Nationalism" and pleads for the church to express its transnational, ecumenical character more clearly in an age such as our own. Nevertheless, Walter Bauer's "The Philosophy of the American Revolution" maintains that Christians have a strong stake in America with its religious and political freedom under the providence of God.

Ernest Schwiebert treats "The Reformation and the Capitalist Revolution," contending that early Lutheranism was keenly interested in economic ethics and tried to foster a genuine spirit in trade and business. Finally, Paul Bretscher writes on "The Communist Manifesto" to remind us what communism is and wants, and how it intends to get what it wants—Christian ethics notwithstanding.

"What can the churches do about world peace?" is the major concern of the study by Hill and Lund. The period 1918-1939 is characterized as one of trial and error for the American Protestant churches in this area. Prior to 1914 the Protestants were not organized for corporate action on crucial world problems. Opinions varied in each pulpit. The beginnings of corporate action between the two great wars, however, were generally dedicated to projects of Utopian idealism totally unrelated to the political power structures of modern nations.

The churches became far more realistic in their 1939-1957 resolutions and pronouncements. Moreover, the ongoing units of the National Council of Churches and the World Council of Churches—particularly the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs—permit the training and experience of specialists who are continually at work on world problems and therefore informed and able to speak competently. "The offsetting disadvantage of C.C.I.A. methods is that

these few leaders will have too much control and their points of view will not accurately reflect the opinions of the churches for which they assume to speak."

The authors face this dilemma with candor and dispatch. They seriously question the ability of the church to speak—as the church —on specific issues in foreign affairs. When government experts find it difficult to make decisions (on the basis of a great deal of classified information unknown to the general public), how can well-meaning but inexperienced churchmen do more than blindly lead the blind through the complex intricacies of modern statecraft? Careful documentation shows how dozens of zealous churches have taken dozens of contradictory positions on the major political issues of the past few decades. Little wonder that they have had little influence on realistic politicians and diplomats.

The conclusion is that the churches would do better "if they would desist from taking sides on the concrete issues of foreign policy." We might infer that churches can best contribute to world peace (1) by encouraging qualified and conscientious Christian laymen to make government service their life's calling; (2) by conducting serious discussion among its laity in the analysis of foreign affairs from the Christian perspective; (3) by helping to create a moral climate of opinion in which solutions to political problems can take place more easily; (4) by acting as a leaven in the body politic; and (5) by reiterating with authority the general principles and guidelines of Christian political ethics to provide direction and criteria for the use of responsible governmental specialists.

WILLIAM H. LAZARETH

Teaching Luther's Catechism. By Herbert Girgensohn. Translated by John W. Doberstein. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1959. 310 pages. $4.00.

It is strange that the church that has laid such great stress on Martin Luther's Catechism should have produced so meagerly in the area of interpretative literature in support of the Catechism. Teaching manuals have not been lacking; but they have been so skeletal in nature that in turn they would have needed other helps toward getting incisively and deeply into the flesh and blood materials of the Catechism. For this reason Lutheran pastors and church school teachers should be most grateful for this volume from the pen of the venerable pastor and Bethel theological professor and for its translation into the English language by the Mt. Airy professor who has become known as one of our most able and prolific translators of German religious and theological works.

It is refreshing in our day to read a book that stresses the content of the Catechism rather than teaching methods. It makes one wonder whether or not the teaching of the Catechism in the Lutheran Church in America has been more pragmatic than theological, more opportunistic than basic, more superficially relevant to the surfaces of life than deeply to the dimensions of the new life in Christ. We are talking so much about putting Luther's Catechism into words of today, especially meeting the vocabulary comprehension level of teen-agers of confirmation age, and we are making definite efforts in that direction. But before meaning can be conveyed even through simplified translations into contemporary language, it is necessary for the catechetical instructor himself to know the fullness of content found in the meanings that led to Luther's original language. The Catechism of our church is more than an orderly assembly of bones; it is a well structured presentation of the flesh and blood of our faith.

The present volume covers the first three chief parts of the Catechism. The translator is working toward completing the remaining sections; and it is eagerly hoped that this work will appear soon to fill out for our day the evangelical note that needs re-emphasis. For reason of its simplicity and its evangelical character the Catechism is and will remain for the Lutheran Church a symbolical work. But it remains for every age to work and rediscover for itself the real meaning of this simplicity and evangelical spirit. What Dr. Girgensohn has done for our generation ought to be done by some contemporary who is on the American scene; and it ought to be done again and again as generations pass by. Only then can Martin Luther's Catechism be understood in its living message.

PAUL M. LINDBERG

The Concept of Grace. By Philip S. Watson. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1959. 115 pages. $2.00.

Philip Watson has already endeared himself to the English reading public, and particularly the Lutheran portion of it, by his translations of several significant Luther studies and his own delightful volume, *Let God Be God.* The present volume truly belongs in that company.

The writer has taken a central concept of Lutheran theology and delineated it clearly from differing interpretations in non-Lutheran theology. He reminds us that for Luther (in contrast to Thomas Aquinas) salvation is by grace *alone;* "not by grace plus merit, not even by grace producing merit, and certainly not by grace earned by merit" (p. 87). It will be clearly understood by any reader of this volume that grace is not to be understood as a substance but rather as the hallmark of a relationship founded solely upon the graciousness (favor) of God.

It follows logically, according to Watson, that Luther placed greater emphasis upon the Word than upon the sacraments, even though he did not set them in opposition to each other. The Word is always ultimately the Word that became flesh in the person of Jesus Christ. This forms the essential content of preaching, and gives the sacramental character to the sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper. It is through the Word that the Holy Spirit is imparted who makes the Scriptures alive and the sacraments significant.

Watson has a fine sense of how far a doctrine may be used without violating the truth it was meant to express. He will not load too much freight on any one car. For instance, in discussing the relationship of grace and free will, he maintains that "the activity of God by no means excludes human activity as such, but only independent, self-willed human activity. This is all that Luther means to exclude when he denies the freedom of man's will in matters relating to salvation" (p. 98).

Serious students will read this volume with one regret. As the author indicates, its first form was a series of lectures and essays. As such he doubtless wisely avoided encumbering them with footnotes and citations. But this leaves the scholar who would like to survey the sources in greater detail at a distinct disadvantage. One could wish that the author's wide knowledge and perceptive understanding of Luther might have led other enthusiasts for Luther to those same fountains from which Watson has drunk so deeply and profitably.

ARNOLD E. CARLSON

Classics of Protestantism. Edited by Vergilius Ferm. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 587 pages. $10.00.

This book is an anthology of 17 selections from 16 Protestant authors selected on the basis of their "right" to be considered classics and their character as representative of "a conspicuous point of view."

This necessarily involves a wide range of subject matter as well as authorship. They are selections from theological works, sermons, and essays. They range from the anonymous *Theologia Germanica* to Karl Barth's *Dogmatics in Outline,* including, en route, selections from Luther, John Calvin, John Wesley, Jonathan Edwards, William Ellery Channing, Søren Kierkegaard, Theodore Parker, Walter Rauschenbusch, and others.

Few would deny that each of these selections is a worthy representative of some aspect of Protestantism. Many will be grateful for the inclusion of some of these selections which are a little difficult to obtain and purchase, having long been out of print. Any selection naturally raises the question of the relative merits of those included and those excluded, but the value of the works which are here presented is recognized by all those familiar with Christian literature. Brief introductions by the editor precede each selection. These are rather elementary in character.

ARTHUR O. ARNOLD

Reformation Crossroads. By Harold H. Lentz. Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1958. 92 pages, paper. $1.75.

As the subtitle indicates, this is "A Comparison of the Theology of Luther and Melanchthon." It effects this comparison in

the four areas of the doctrine of atonement, the doctrine of justification by faith, the Augsburg Confession, and the Formula of Concord. The discussion is mainly historical, and it ranges widely over the history of the Lutheran Church in Europe and in America. Much attention is given to the present theological situation on a wide Lutheran front. The main proposition is that the Lutheran Church, while appreciating the significance of Melanchthon, especially in his early works, has repudiated his later and mediating views. Much information is given, and the appetite of the reader is whetted for a more thoroughgoing study of the subject.

J. KNUDSEN

Treatises and Sermons of Meister Eckhart. Selected and translated by James M. Clark and John V. Skinner. New York: Harpers, 1958. 267 pages. $4.00.

This book is quite obviously a "labor of love." The painstaking work involved was carried through by two English scholars, James Clark and John Skinner, who did this in order to correct "one-sided or inaccurate opinions" about Meister Eckhart. The life of this great fourteenth-century mystic has long been shrouded in mystery, and many misconceptions of his work have resulted. Recognizing this to be the case, the authors wisely concluded that "the best way to clear the ground for a better understanding of the true Eckhart is to let him speak for himself." This they have done by translating and reproducing all of the "genuine" German treatises, selected German sermons, plus certain excerpts from the Meister's Latin works. The latter, by the way, had never before been translated into English. This work was done chiefly because Clark and Skinner felt that Eckhart could not be properly understood in the light of his German works alone.

There is such a marked difference between Eckhart's German works and his Latin works that the authors wondered at times "if the same writer is responsible for both." But the reason for this is quite evident. In the German sermons, for example, Eckhart was speaking to ordinary people, eager for instruction and edification. Down-to-earth illustrations and metaphors abound in these works. The authors speak of Eckhart's German in terms of its "vigorous and forceful speech, its freshness of metaphor, its sense of language in the process of creation." When Eckhart used the Latin tongue, on the other hand, he was usually addressing men who, like himself, were at home in Latin, conversant with the fine points of theology, well-read in other pertinent sources as well. In such cases Eckhart was more eclectic and deliberate. Careful documentation was always provided. The Meister is much more stilted and formal in his Latin works as a result. It is in this connection that the authors come down hard upon the constant use of Latin in the Middle Ages. While they recognize its advantage as an international medium, they also feel that it was "a handicap rather than a help in the progress of culture." Eckhart, they found, was a far "different person" when he wrote in German, his native tongue, for he then had shaken off "the trammels of an acquired language."

In addition to the German works and the Latin sermons found in this book, the authors also included excerpts from Eckhart's commentaries on *Exodus* and the *Gospel of John.* These works, taken as a whole, were chosen in order to present, in outline form, Eckhart's thought as a philosopher and a mystic. The selection appears admirably suited to this purpose. For all who are interested in Eckhart himself, or in the medieval mystics in general, this book is highly recommended. Lutherans may be interested to know that, in the oinion of the authors, the contention that Eckhart was a "harbinger of the Reformation" is a "mistaken view."

GENE LUND

English Collegiate Churches of the Middle Ages. By G. H. Cook. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960. 228 pages. $10.00.

Church history and architecture are the two strands of the narrative of this book. It obviously is possible to explain the structure of the church buildings herein described only by giving an account of the circumstances under which each part was erected. Such circumstances involved the policies, the needs, and even the ambitions of the persons concerned.

This volume limits itself to collegiate

churches since previous volumes by this author have discussed parish churches, chapels, and cathedrals. In this respect this volume is unique. As herein defined, "A collegiate church was one in which the governing body was a band of priests whose duties were, as in the cathedral churches, to recite the canonical hours, to provide for the cure of souls in the parish, and to minister to the spiritual needs of the prebendal estates." Established and endowed by bishops and kings such churches could have a degree both of independence and of magnificence.

In the organization of the book the collegiate churches are grouped according to their age, the nature of their founding, or their relation to other institutions. The treatment is factual. The history of the founding of each church, the notable events connected with it, a diagram of its floor plan, a description of its structure, and photographs of the edifice are provided.

The photography, both of exteriors and of interiors, is excellent. Prominent are the ministers of Beverley, Ripon, and Southwell, as well as St. George's Chapel, Windsor, New College Chapel at Oxford, and King's College Chapel at Cambridge. It is obvious, therefore, that this is more of a reference work than a monograph, since each church is treated separately.

The author evidently has been at pains to ascertain details both of history and of construction. Though there are few footnotes, it is apparent that he has consulted primary sources. Moreover, his treatment of a mass of data is in the form of a pleasing narrative. In general this is an attractive book, skillfully prepared, and furnishing detailed information in a neglected field.

W. D. Allbeck

The Racial Problem in Christian Perspective. By Kyle Haselden. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. 217 pages.

There are many commendable qualities in Mr. Haselden's presentation. His style is interesting and his understanding of the subject reveals a careful study of history, psychology, and sociology as well as theology. The most compelling feature of the book, however, is its soul-searching. This book somehow thwarts all attempts to treat the racial problem with detachment. It addresses not only our minds but our souls. It is the kind of book we need to read.

Mr. Haselden's thesis is that in Christian perspective the inner secrets of racial hostility become clear. The social sciences, in spite of their helpful studies, somehow fall short of real understanding since they tend to treat prejudice as an adhesive to human nature rather than as an expression of man's essential nature. Racial thinking, Haselden maintains, is related to race only incidentally and to human nature directly. Basically, prejudice is another of man's neurotic and perverted attempts to be God. The forms of this basic perversion are numerous. The exclusion involved in segregation is evil because it excludes on grounds that are not relevant. The justice that is supposed to exist in the "separate but equal" arrangement is no justice at all, for it splits on the circumference of life what cannot be split at the center. The humanity that some see in paternalism is a fraud, for it denies the real fraternity of men. The message of the Christian ethic which must be addressed to all men is that God "hath made from one every nation of men to live on all the face of the earth." There is an elemental and universal kinship, a "oneness" which derives from an understanding that we are of the same substance. To deny this kinship in the interests of an assumed superiority is the perversion of playing God. Since the basic problem is spiritual, the solution must also be primarily spiritual. Prejudice gives way only to the Spirit of God, whose power, however, must not be understood as being restricted to sectarian boundaries.

The emphasis in the book upon the primary nature of the spiritual does not exclude the importance of the civilizing efforts of education or the role of law in establishing justice. Improvement socially does not depend upon the existence of a universally redeemed people, according to Haselden. The history of human progress is in part the struggle to have power as its ally. The realistic power factor which accompanies the non-violent boycotts and sit-ins is in fact the use of the vast power in the social and economic system to work for justice. The position the author has taken in this area can perhaps be best assessed by his statement, "It is

better to have laws which exceed the generosities of people than it is to legalize by omission injustices which violate the rights and dignities of men" (p. 115).

The one area in which a more extended treatment would have seemed appropriate is in regard to the racial problem in Protestant churches. Haselden indicates that the freedom of churches from federal edicts and from episcopal control, plus the familial and social functions of Protestant churches, make the task of integration in white Protestant churches herculean in nature. This being the case, it would seem important to give extended consideration to the resources available in the Christian fellowship for the reduction of intergroup tensions. "Physician heal thyself" is not an unfair charge against white American Protestantism.

LOUIS ALMÉN

The Waiting Father. By Helmut Thielicke. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959. 192 pages. $3.75.

This reviewer has always had ambivalent feelings about the publishing of sermons. Mostly he has been opposed to it. But here is a book which could change his mind on the subject. The reading of these sermons on the parables of Jesus is both a religious experience and a theological exercise.

These sermons are by a man who knows the Gospel, who knows human nature, and who knows how to relate the one to the other. They are full of realism and they are full of hope. They are scholarly without seeming to be so. They are theological without being dull or trite. Although they vary slightly in quality—and some of them seem to labor the point too long—they are almost consistently masterpieces in the art of homiletics.

Thielicke knows theology and has a theological position. That is why the message is not varied or contradicted from one sermon to another. Hereafter let no one say that systematic theologians cannot preach or that European theologians do not know how to preach. There is Thielicke to give the lie to both claims.

The repeated message of these sermons is simple, biblical, and relevant. In the parables of Jesus we always see ourselves in our position before God. God is the waiting Father who longs for the prodigal child, every prodigal child, to come home. He accepts and welcomes the prodigal as he is, includes him in the fellowship of the home, helps him reorganize his life. God, the waiting Father, takes the initiative and does all things for man's redemption. The spectacular good news of the Gospel is that God cares for the sinner and reaches for him.

Thielicke has no time for legalism. He is exceptionally hard on self-righteousness. He does not minimize sin. But he preaches as one convinced, as one who must preach, as one who knows that Christ's sovereignty is indisputable, as one who wants the message heard and accepted by many.

The translator, John W. Doberstein, deserves commendation for his work. As one who has read much German theology, including many of the more weighty books of Thielicke, I can say that this translation (especially the idiomatic transpositions) is outstanding.

Publish or read books of sermons? Maybe. Read this book of sermons? Do not fail to do so!

L. DALE LUND

The Dying and Living Lord. By Helmut Gollwitzer. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1960. 123 pages, paperback. $1.25.

This little volume came to the reviewer's attention during the Lenten season of 1960. It is a series of meditations on the passion and resurrection of our Lord. Each is done with all the earmarks of competent biblical scholarship *and* with penetrating insight into the reality of the human situation in which a normal Lenten audience finds itself. When one remembers that the author preached each of these sermons in the Confessing Church at Dahlem, as Martin Niemoller's successor, expecting momentarily to be imprisoned, their transparent relevance and depth are not surprising. This is the kind of sermon which American audiences, long cheated by aspirin-dispensing sermons, are hungering to hear.

The sermon on Joseph of Arimathea is one of the finest. In it you are never permitted to dismiss the reality of Christ's death. As you go with Joseph to take the body down from the cross you sense how a whole world of

hope has collapsed. "They saw the mouth which had spoken the words of eternal life now closed and silent, as they saw the eyes which were once streaming with love now sightless in death" (89). Thus the world succeeded in "putting God behind its back." But when Easter comes we are permitted to say with Joseph: "One has lain before us in our grave, and he will lift the lid and roll away the stone of hopelessness and finality. Through him those who die do really rise again and praise God. Through him graves really do become places where God's goodness and faithfulness are praised. . . . So our hopelessness becomes a preparation for a hope, our grave a sign of life—because even in the grave we have communion with Jesus Christ. For there he lies too" (91).

In this reviewer's opinion it would be a condition devoutly to be desired that American preachers (and not least Lutheran preachers) would avail themselves of the penetrating and inspiring sermonic materials that are coming to us from pulpits overseas. Helmut Gollwitzer deserves to be read. Congregations will be grateful for those preachers who will do so.

ARNOLD E. CARLSON

The Epistles to the Philippians. By F. W. Beare. New York: Harpers, 1959. 182 pages. $3.50.

As the author states in his preface, "this commentary is designed primarily for the use of readers who do not know Greek." Nevertheless, Greek words occur not infrequently, and the exegesis is done on the basis of the original text.

There is a comparatively long introduction of 46 pages. The authenticity of the epistle is of course not questioned, but it is maintained, not too convincingly, that Philippians is made up of three separate compositions of Paul. After fairly stating the arguments pro and con, Dr. Beare chooses Rome over Ephesus as the place where the epistle was written. One introductory section is entitled "Theology and 'Spirituality.'" The author holds that Paul "deals with theological questions only because they force themselves upon him in direct relation to his pastoral and evangelistic duties," this being eminently true of the Hymn to Christ also (2:6-11). The introduction concludes with a select but rather extensive bibliography.

The translation of the epistle is that of Dr. Beare; both at the head of each section and as fragments in the commentary, it appears in bold print. A fine feature of the format is that not only are chapter and verse references given at the top of each page, but the numbers of the verses are given in the side margins as well. Bibliographical references in the exposition are quite extensive, from those to modern authors to citations from the ancient Greeks (i.e., Sophocles, Plato, Aristotle). To interpret Scripture, Scripture is generously used, especially the writings of Paul. Sometimes just when one might conclude, "Dr. Beare should have written more on this," an additional note shows up, e.g. on "The Life to Come," "'Kenosis' as a Moral Ideal," "'Righteousness' and 'Justify' in the Usage of Paul," "The Hope of the Resurrection." The author makes allowances for both the Hellenic and the Hebraic in Paul: "We find Paul making a new, creative fusion of the Hellenic with the Hebraic, which issues in a distinctively *Christian* synthesis far richer than either, though it is the heir of both."

Lutherans will not be satisfied with some of the author's comments on baptism, nor would they be likely to accept as their position "Lutheran 'monophysitism'" as explicated in the appended note, "The 'Kenotic' Christology," by E. R. Fairweather, who attacks kenoticism with quotations from Origen to Barth. The translation of Phil. 4:4 seems far from satisfactory: "I bid you farewell in the Lord, always; again I shall say, Fare you well." In connection with 3:8-10, it would be helpful if the author were more explicit as to what he means by "mystical" and "mystically." But in general this book is a scholarly, up-to-date, and relevant commentary on the epistle in which Paul "reveals [to his readers] the springs of his own spiritual life and invites them to imitate his devotion."

LOWELL J. SATRE

Student's Hebrew Lexicon. By Benjamin Davies and Edward C. Mitchell. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House. 752 pages. $5.95.

This is a reprint of a book first published

in 1871, with a revised 3rd edition in 1880. As a preface to the lexicon there is included "A Concise Statement of the Principles of Hebrew Grammar" for the use of teachers and of beginners in the study of Hebrew. The lexicon is said to have been compiled "with special reference to the wants of learners," and it serves this limited purpose with reasonable adequacy. It can be commended for giving surprisingly good coverage, considering its limited size. It is also reasonably accurate, as might be expected in a lexicon based largely on Gesenius and Furst; but it could stand a little modernization to bring it abreast of new insights from the intensive Old Testament studies of the past seventy-five years. For the more advanced Hebrew student there is a serious weakness in that words from the same root are not listed together but according to their spelling, as in a modern dictionary. This simplifies looking up the word as encountered in reading, but it obscures the etymological relationships which often contribute so much to our understanding both of the Hebrew language and of Hebrew thought-forms. In the case of some of the more significant religious terms, where there exists a great diversity of meaning in actual biblical usage, the lexical definition and illustration is often oversimplified. This is strictly a book for beginners, and as such it can be recommended; the advanced student will do better with such lexicons as Brown-Driver-Briggs, or Koehler-Baumgartner, or even Gesenius-Tregelles. The printing of the present volume by Zondervan is well done, which makes reading easy.

J. P. Milton

Christendom: The Christian Churches, Their Doctrines, Constitutional Forms and Ways of Worship. By Einar Molland. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 418 pages. $10.00.

The professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Oslo translated his own book on comparative symbolics from Norwegian into English. Canon H. E. W. Turner, of Durham University, improved what the author calls his own "rather clumsy English," and "his work in doing so has amounted to a complete re-writing of the whole book in order to make its style idiomatic." However this modest statement in the preface may be evaluated, the resulting English version is graceful, lucid, and highly readable. In the process of preparing the English edition Turner added a number of explanatory footnotes, some of which are helpful.

The book treats what we are accustomed to expect in such a presentation of the churches and sects of Christendom, but the order in which the several communions are discussed is novel and suggestive. The author begins with the right wing: the Eastern Orthodox and the Russian sects, the Roman Catholics, Old Catholics, and Irvingites, and finally the Anglicans and the Church of South India. The center is represented by the Lutherans, Reformed, Waldensians, and Methodists. The left wing includes, in this order, the Congregationalists, Baptists, Disciples, Pentecostals, Salvation Army, Darbyites, Swedenborgians, Adventists, and Quakers. Appended are some "religious systems containing elements derived from Christianity": Unitarians, Christian Scientists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Mormons. The book closes with a discussion of the relations of religious bodies to one another, the disunion of Christendom, and the ecumenical movement.

The analyses and descriptions of churches and sects achieve commendable fairness without blurring the lines of distinction which actually exist. To avoid too static a picture, the descriptions of the Roman, Anglican, and Lutheran churches have supplements which indicate recent developments, the supplementary section on the Anglicans prepared by Turner. In the case of each church and sect there is an incisive analysis of characteristic features, and in addition to historical, geographical, and statistical orientations there is a discussion of polity, doctrine, and worship. An excellent bibliography is appended, and the indexes are good.

Although written by a European, the book does justice to American religious life without losing itself in denominational minutiae. The bibliography includes many English titles, but regrettable is the want of acquaintance in Britain (less excusable than in Norway) with available American translations of some of the books cited. Regrettable, too, is the outrageous price for this American

imprint edition, for the price will certainly curtail the circulation and use which the book deserves on this side of the Atlantic.

THEODORE G. TAPPERT

Luther the Expositor. Introduction to the Reformer's Exegetical Writings. Companion volume in Luther's Works. By Jaroslav Pelikan. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1959. 286 pages. $4.00.

The inclusion of this study as a "companion volume" in the American edition of *Luther's Works* raises two questions. The first concerns the propriety of placing the study in this context. Of course, writings of Luther require some introduction to enable readers to see them in their historical setting, but it may be questioned whether an edition of Luther's works in translation ought to be the place for monographs of this sort unless similar volumes are devoted to the Reformer's use of history, his techniques as a letter writer or preacher, the character of his argumentation in polemics, etc. The second question is related to the first and concerns the effect of burying such a study in the fifty-five-volume edition of Luther. Like some of the long articles in the *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche* which are virtually book-length, this monograph is likely to be neglected by all but the best-informed bibliographers. It would appear to be appropriate to keep Luther texts and studies on these texts separate, and especially so because of the progress in Luther research which rapidly outdates such studies.

All of this is not intended to disparage Professor Pelikan's excellent study. On the contrary, it is intended to highlight its value as an independent investigation which conveniently brings together and adds to current knowledge concerning Luther's exegetical procedures. After discussing the important role which biblical exegesis has played in the history of theology and in Luther's career, the author discusses how the Reformer's conceptions of the Word of God, the Scriptures, tradition, and the church affected his exegesis and how controversy sometimes sharpened and sometimes clouded his insight into the witness of the Bible. What is here reported about the Reformation understanding of the Word of God and the Scriptures should shed light on many a contemporary discussion within the Lutheran Church in North America.

The second half of the volume is intended to illustrate Luther's exegesis in practice by showing how he handled some of the traditional themes in the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. His exegesis of a few key texts is unfolded: "This is my body," "for the forgiveness of sins," "if anyone eats of this bread," "participation in the body of Christ," "do this in remembrance of me," "you proclaim the Lord's death," and "once for all the sacrifice of himself." As was natural, Luther's treatment of such texts in his sermons and commentaries was not only more relaxed but also fuller and more many-sided than his treatment of them in his polemics with those on his right and on his left.

The author here makes a good case for Luther's exegetical skill and conclusions without glossing over his limitations. No attempt is made to set forth Luther's developing understanding in chronological order, but the reader can get some inkling of this from the footnotes. Here and there one may be inclined to quarrel with the weight the author ascribes to one or another aspect of Luther's understanding of the sacrament (for example, the interpretation of the words of institution as warrant as over against personal address, or what appears to be too great readiness to accept the criticism that Luther's emphasis on forgiveness was an over-simplification), but the reader should be stimulated by such questions to re-examine the evidence, some of which is already available in English and more of it soon will be in the American edition of *Luther's Works,* and then, as the author suggests, to see if this squares with the witness of the Bible. In any case, Pelikan's book is of great importance both for what it states and for what it does not state, and it should be read by non-subscribers as well as subscribers of *Luther's Works.*

THEODORE G. TAPPERT